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ABSTRACT

MARGARET CAVENDISH AND SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE
IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND

Alisa Curtis Bolander
Department of English
Master of Arts

Although the natural philosophy of Margaret Cavendish is eclectic and
uncustomary, it offers an important critique of contemporary scientific methods,
especially mechanism and experimentalism. As presented in Observations upon
Experimental Philosophy and Blazing World, Cavendish’s natural philosophy
incorporates rationalistic and subjective elements, urging contemporary natural
philosophers to recognize that pure objectivity is unattainable through any method of
inquiry and that reason is essential in making sense and use of scientific observation.
In addition to its scientific implications, Cavendish’s three-tiered model of matter
presents interesting sociopolitical associations. Through her own use of metaphor and
her theoretical fusion of matter and motion, Cavendish confronts the masculinist
metaphors and implications of mechanism. Through the dramatization of her model of
matter in the narrative Blazing World, Cavendish exposes the theoretical failings of

contemporary methods and legitimizes her alternative to pure experimentalism. By
envisioning a new planet to place the utopia of Blazing World, Cavendish actively uses
the rational functions of the mind, showing that reason and rational matter are above all
else in natural philosophy.
Although Cavendish’s scientific theory in some ways promotes the participation
of women in natural philosophy, it becomes complicated as she simultaneously reinforces
her social biases and urges a traditional class system with a monarchical government.
Cavendish actively separates the gender constraints in philosophical inquiry from the
social limitations placed on the lower classes to promote herself and other aristocratic
women in the pursuit of natural philosophy, urging that the rational realm, where all
sexes are equal, should govern scientific investigation.
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CHAPTER ONE
Conceptual Framework of Seventeenth-Century Natural Philosophy
and the Role of Margaret Cavendish
“Cavendish’s writing is not only copious and unusually secular, it is also overtly
polemical and formally experimental […]. An interrogation of systems of knowledge and
modes of description, as well as the fluid relations between gender and genre, informs all
of Cavendish’s writing, and marks it as generically self-conscious and ambitious.”
—Kate Lilley, Introduction, The Blazing World and Other Writings

Kate Lilley’s description, intended to depict Margaret Cavendish’s general
writing, epitomizes Blazing World. The writing in this scientific narrative is surely
experimental, and even until recently the text confused critics who read it alongside other
early-modern utopias.1 But through a detailed examination of how exactly Cavendish
sees nature, how she constructs her theory of matter, how she implies this structure
through figures and metaphor, and what social and political implications Cavendish
draws from this theory of matter, we come to a far greater appreciation for the philosophy
of Blazing World.
This thesis focuses on Cavendish’s scientific narrative, Blazing World, and the
adjoining scientific treatise, Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, showing how
both texts reveal Cavendish’s idiosyncratic and eclectic theory of matter, a model
incorporating mainstream philosophies of rationalism, empiricism, and mechanism, but

1

Marina Leslie, in Renaissance Utopias and the Problem of History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1998)
records that Frank and Fritzie Manuel refused to include Blazing World in their utopian encyclopedia due
to what they believed to be an apparent “schizophrenia” on the part of Cavendish (128). In 1918 Henry
Ten Eyck Perry wrote in his study, The Duchess of Newcastle and her Husband as Figures in Literary
History, that the creator of the Blazing World “was, on one occasion at least, dangerously far from sanity”
(qtd. in Whitaker, Mad Madge: The Extraordinary Life of Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle, the
First Woman to Live by Her Pen. New York: Basic Books, 2002, 356).

1

adding to these the elements of fancy, freedom of access regardless of sex, and
subjectivity of human scales and purposes. In this discussion, we will assert four main
points. The first point is that Cavendish’s theory of matter, previously laid out in her
scientific treatises (especially Observations upon Experimental Philosophy), is also
evident in Blazing World. Second, Cavendish’s theory of matter within Blazing World is
a force of philosophical critique, sometimes countering and sometimes modifying and
incorporating the scientific ideas of her mechanist and experimentalist contemporaries.
Third, Cavendish’s theory favors women’s participation in natural philosophy in its
implications, metaphors, and explanations of natural phenomena more than the popular
trends of mechanism and experimentalism in England. Although Cavendish’s support for
women’s participation in science is often critiqued as undemocratic, an exploration of
how Cavendish links natural philosophy to the sociopolitical realm allows us to see why
it is not contradictory that she wants a space for women to take part in philosophical
discussions while she enforces the norms of traditional social class. Fourth, as Cavendish
refines her theory in the course of her writing, the narrative genre allows her to dramatize
her theory and scientific observations. Within the context of seventeenth-century
scientific debate, the genre of fictional narrative provides Cavendish a place to express
her ideas and bring them into the sociopolitical realm.
In her interlude between Observations upon Experimental Philosophy and A
Description of a New World, Called the Blazing World, Cavendish says that she “add[s]
this piece of fancy to [her] philosophical observations, and join[s] them as two worlds at

2

the ends of their poles” (Blazing 124).2 This metaphor suggests that the connection
between the Blazing World (ruled by fancy) and the “real” world of the Duchess of
Newcastle (governed by sense and reason) is a direct parallel between the two texts
Observations and Blazing World. Just as the Blazing World is marveled at for its
differences to our world while still teaching us about the nature of our world through
parallels, so the text of Blazing World compares and contrasts to Observations in ways
that supplement our understanding of Cavendish’s philosophy.
In her time, Cavendish faced a large amount of opposition against her writing, not
only for publishing so prolifically and emphatically under her own name but also for her
bold assertion of her own social, political, and scientific opinions. After reading one of
Cavendish’s early publications, Dorothy Osborne remarked in a letter to a friend that
there were “many soberer people in Bedlam; I’ll swear her friends are much to blame for
letting her go abroad” (qtd. in Lilley xiii). Despite the move in the last couple of decades
to read and understand more fully early modern women’s writing, Cavendish’s writing
and scientific theories have not been without modern-day critics. Lisa Sarasohn
describes Cavendish’s writings as “a curious combination of scientific explanation and
fantasy, largely uncritical and hopelessly repetitive” (290). Carolyn Merchant reports
that Cavendish’s theories “are often inconsistent, contradictory, and eclectic.” Some
recent critics, such as Laura Carraro and Antonella Rigamonti, assess Cavendish’s
contemporary significance as nil:
[N]otwithstanding the undeniable privileges of her rank, Cavendish found
no audience, she never became part of a circle, she was not recognized as
2

The editions used here are The Blazing World and Other Writings. Ed. Kate Lilley. New York: Penguin,
1992; and Observations upon Experimental Philosophy. Ed. Eileen O'Neill. Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
2001.
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a natural philosopher. When people looked at her they did not see a
learned lady but simply the Duke of Newcastle’s wife or the notorious
‘Mad Madge.’ When she discoursed on science what people actually
heard were, in the words of Mary Evelyn, ‘rambling’ words which, like
her books, aimed ‘at science, difficulties, high notions, terminating
commonly in nonsense, oaths and obscenity.’ (139)
Yet as scholarship on Cavendish blossoms, more critics have found reason to defend
Cavendish’s writings despite the sporadic contradictions that surface as Cavendish
revises her theories. Although her voice wasn’t often taken seriously (though more
seriously than Carraro and Rigamonti suggest), her voice is valuable to us for many
reasons. One is that it is very rare. It was rare in the seventeenth century for an aristocrat
to publish so prolifically in a variety of genres without omitting one’s true name from the
publication. The fact that Cavendish, as a female aristocrat did so vouches for her
singularity.3 Second, it was rare for a woman, though not formally educated, to have
been blessed with a small circle of scholars, including not only her husband and brotherin-law but also the distinguished physician Walter Charleton, who, biographer Katie
Whitaker records, was “surprisingly honest” in “daring” to give Cavendish “not uncritical
feedback on her philosophical work” (138). These men praised her work and sometimes
offered revisions to her writings, thus enabling Cavendish to pursue topics often
considered masculine. Cavendish’s writing affords us a female perspective on issues that
most of her female contemporaries wouldn’t ever dream of exploring.

3

Kate Lilley states, “If it was rare for a woman to seek publication, it was still more rare for a woman to
provide an unambiguous authorial signature,” and suggests that this epitomizes Cavendish’s drive for
singularity (The Blazing World and Other Writings. Introduction. New York: Penguin, 1992, x).
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Sarasohn is right in that Cavendish combines fantasy and science, and nowhere
does she do this more than in Blazing World, where she uses fancy to create a work
“agreeable to the subject treated of in the former parts,” that is, in her scientific treatise
Observations upon Experimental Philosophy (Blazing 124). In her scientific narrative
Cavendish relishes the blending of fancy and reason, asserting that they both originate
from the same place, which is the “rational parts” of her mind (Blazing 224). Through
combining fancy (in this case synonymous with imagination, see OED def 4.a) with the
reason of her serious philosophical study, Cavendish is able to play out the results of her
theory of matter, show its benefits and limits, and dramatize her theory as she figuratively
represents it in a variety of hierarchical structures. Where Sarasohn is chiefly incorrect is
in asserting that Cavendish’s writings are “uncritical.” As we will examine, even the
fictional narrative Blazing World serves as a mode of critique against the emerging
philosophies of mechanism and experimentalism in Cavendish’s day.
As Cavendish recognizes her partial exclusion from a male-dominated scientific
community, she uses the venue of fictional narrative alongside her scientific treatises to
promote herself as a rational and contemplative natural philosopher. Yet Cavendish’s
scientific utopia differs greatly from other utopias written by her male contemporaries,
such as Bacon’s. Instead of discovering an already existing country, island, or continent,
Cavendish creates a new planet, and adds to it several mental or “philosophical” worlds.
As we will discuss in later chapters, Cavendish does so for several reasons. The first is to
claim the rational and subjective realm as her own, in direct contrast to the
experimentalists’ drive for objectivity. By illustrating her newly created mental world,
Cavendish attempts to gain critical immunity by using the elements of fantasy and reason,
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both rational powers, that are more subjective, thereby showing that rational and fanciful
people, regardless of sex, can participate in the discourses of natural philosophy, for it is
reason and the mind where all experience must be filtered and all knowledge must
originate. Placing her utopia on another planet affords her other opportunities as well,
allowing her to circumvent traditional patriarchal reproductive economies and make sex
irrelevant in not only the ability to reason, but also with regard to reproduction. Through
creating a new world and reconstructing the biblical paradise, Cavendish is able to use
her own ingenuity and natural philosophy to reverse the fall of humankind and remove
the blame placed upon Eve.
There are several reasons why Cavendish was not regarded as an equal among
her male contemporaries in England, including differing levels of credibility among
English social classes and a certain rhetoric used by male natural philosophers that
excluded women. A review of recent revisionist scholarship pertaining to what we have
traditionally called the Scientific Revolution suggests why women, including Cavendish,
were excluded from scientific circles that purported to discover and reveal natural truths.
Next, a focus on the problem of rhetoric as seen by the Royal Society and its frequent use
of two metaphors, that of the mechanical universe and that of a female natural world that
awaits discovery, reveals one way in which science was linked to the sociopolitical realm
and in some ways excluded women. In addition, an exploration of the methods of
experimentalism and rationalism will introduce us to the theoretical framework necessary
to understand Cavendish’s model of matter. Finally, we will examine Margaret
Cavendish’s place within this conceptual framework and the issues she faced in
attempting to create a space for her within seventeenth-century scientific discourse.

6

We cannot explain why Cavendish’s natural philosophy was often ridiculed by
her contemporaries without discussing the role that her gender played in the reception of
her ideas. In A Social History of Truth, Steven Shapin argues that gentry and nobility
were considered to be more reliable conveyers of knowledge than members of lower
classes who might be in compromising positions because of their dependency; therefore,
men were seen as more reliable than their wives (86).4 Determining who had the social
or political right to dispense knowledge in seventeenth-century England is important for
the purposes of this discussion because it explains in part why Cavendish and other
women were excluded (at least partially) from the scientific scene (Shapin Truth 370).
Shapin shows that during the seventeenth century, women were seen as a dependant
group of people:
But just because the characteristic view was that women took their social
standing from men, that their identity was subsumed in that of their father
or husband, and that they worked their will through men, the relevant
category of analysis was not the natural one of biological endowment and
its expression but the situated cultural one of dependence. And
dependence was a circumstance that was understood to affect biological
males in much the same way it worked on biological females. (Truth 87)
Distinguishing between social and biological reasons for disregarding the testimony of
women is important to understanding Cavendish’s reasoning as she desired to make a
place for herself and other aristocratic women to participate in scientific discourse but

4

“Those whose placement in society rendered them dependant upon others, whose actions were at others’
bidding, or who were so placed as to need relative advantage were for these reasons deemed liable to
misrepresent real states of affair—what they were actually thinking, what their intentions were with respect
to future action, how matters stood in the world.” (Shapin, Truth 86)

7

refused to make a place for all women. It doesn’t vindicate Cavendish from the feminist
critique of being anti-democratic or refusing solidarity with all her female “sisters,” but
helps us understand why to Cavendish it seemed logical to privilege her social class
above her sex when it came to apparent potential for education or philosophy; to
Cavendish women of the gentry were just as reliable as their male social counterparts.
Not only was it important who presented scientific knowledge, there was also a
drive to find methods of inquiry that would involve the least possible interpretation on the
part of the natural philosopher so that knowledge could come more directly from nature
itself, avoiding the speculative filtering process. In challenging traditional forms of
obtaining truth, seventeenth-century natural philosophers set about finding different ways
to find out about their universe. This was seen in challenging truth based solely on
authority or deduction from general principles, methods previously applied in
scholasticism or rationalism. In England, this change was specifically evident in the new
faith placed in experimental philosophy, a mechanistic view of the world, and inductive
reasoning. However, Shapin shows that seventeenth-century England did not actually see
an introduction of completely new scientific principles (despite those natural
philosophers who saw themselves as revolutionists), but that these methods were more of
a reformed knowledge from faded theories.5 This resulted in the inclusion of technology,
previously left to the artisan guilds, to help the philosopher learn about nature and master
it.6
5

The Scientific Revolution. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1996.

6

In Solomon’s Child, William Lynch explains that Francis Bacon saw technology as more useful than
simple observation because technology was handed down from artisans and men of trade who were
accustomed to encountering nature in its most crude form and bending it to their will (22). “Nature is only
truly understood when we operate upon the world and learn to produce a variety of effects at will rather
than relying upon the accidental arrangement of qualities existing in unaltered nature. Like the artisan, the
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The use of technology carried with it collaborative and democratic implications,
elements that concerned a social conservative like Cavendish. The use of instruments
was carried into the class-conscious Royal Society where it was largely accepted.
William Lynch accounts that the Royal Society, which contained “Royalist, Anglican,
and distinctly class-conscious” gentlemen such as John Evelyn who shunned “engaging
‘mechanical, capricious persons,’” still maintained a Baconian interest in the ‘history of
trades’ and “welcomed the interest in questions of trade and technology of Royal Society
Fellows like William Petty and Robert Hooke, both humble in origins” (4). But once the
Royal Society had accepted and trained its members in this technology derived from
artisans in lower classes, its goal was to make the use of this technology a strictly
gentlemanly pursuit.7
The use of artisan’s instruments across classes shows that seventeenth-century
England was a place of collaboration and conversation. Experimental philosophers found
out from tradesmen how to use tools to manipulate and observe nature, and because the
various fields of artisan experience were too vast, natural philosophers listened and
learned from each other. There was also a need for conversation in order to concur on
observations. Shapin explains this need:
If A says that a cell is elongated, and B describes it as circular, their
subsequent conversation may, for instance, stabilize upon reference to a

experimentalist operates upon the world; and does not merely observe it” (Lynch 22). The issue with using
technology derived from the lower classes was again one of reliability and resulted in a dichotomy. The
use of artisan’s instruments was seen as a new way of examining nature, but to some philosophers,
including Cavendish, it weakened the reliability of the experimentalists’ findings because the technology
arose from lower, more-dependant, and therefore less-reliable classes.
7
For instance, Lynch shows that in Sylva, a book containing instructions to gentlemen on how to best
landscape their orchards, Evelyn suggests that the gentry not rely on servants for advice on planting,
showing that once gentlemen learned the tricks of a trade, that they maintain class-based control (Solomon's
Child: Method in the Early Royal Society of London. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2001, 49).

9

cell that is, and always was, oval. The conversation need not, though it
may, invoke perspectival differences or distinctions of instrumental access
or skill. Knowledge of the world is given its shape as conversation
proceeds. (Truth 33)
Shapin shows that this collaboration was especially revered in England and that it
stemmed from Bacon’s methodology, which differed from Descartes’ because it
emphasized collective labor rather than individual reason (Shapin Revolution 130). In
Exiles of the Mind, Anna Battigelli shows how Hooke’s experimental philosophy, which
he believed to be a fulfillment of Baconian natural philosophy, was largely democratic in
that it made the scientific experience available to everyone and placed, as Hooke says,
‘all wits and understandings nearly on a level’ (92). This is made possible because
interpreting science through technology (once accessible to everyone) and the senses
makes all observers equal as long as their bodies are equally adapted to observe and
receive information. Again, we can see that to a traditionalist like Cavendish, this
challenged the idea that truth was best understood by and revealed through the gentry,
whose breeding, social status, and education made their minds more suitable to
philosophical pursuits. Experimentalism had the potential to make common people equal
to the gentry as authorities in natural philosophy.
The use of artisan’s technology bridged a gap where knowledge of commoners
could be accepted by the gentry and used in their own pursuit of truth, but some
contemporaries, Cavendish included, saw the experimental philosophy and its
collaboration, along with the idea that nearly anyone was capable of making scientific
observations, as too democratic. Cavendish thought that multiple interpretations of
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differing observations, though sometimes helpful to revealing truth, would often lead to
picking sides and disputes among gentlemen philosophers.8 Like her husband, William,
and Thomas Hobbes, Cavendish believed that the best scientific inquiry didn’t rely in
collective labor but in unadulterated reason.9 Shapin argues why this was such a
politically and socially charged issue: “Knowledge of nature was considered deeply
relevant to problems of order, not least because nature was widely understood to be a
divinely authored book whose proper reading and proper interpretation had the potential
to secure right belief and thus to guarantee right conduct” (Revolution 125). Anna
Battigelli shows that the Royal Society was not in agreement on whether or not their
approach to experimental philosophy would cause disruptions. It seemed probable that
through objective experiment and observation all men who had access to the experiments
and evidence were likely to agree. Thomas Hobbes, who was not part of the Society,
opposed this idea, saying that these “procedures could never yield the degree of certainty
requisite in any enterprise worthy of being called philosophical” (Battigelli 90). But
considering these valid arguments, Shapin contends there was even more reason to accept
the work of gentlemen scientists. “A society dominated by gentlemen could more
effectively draw on codes of genteel civility and decorum in conducting philosophical
debate and evaluating testimony” (Revolution 134). Indeed, the men of the Royal Society
thought that their manners as gentlemen would provide a “powerful alternative to

8

In Blazing World, Cavendish’s Empress refuses to allow her philosophers to argue in her court and
commands them to “confine [their] disputations to [their] schools,” and later orders that the schools be
disbanded altogether because varying opinions and degrees of knowledge “must needs breed factions in
their schools, which at last break out into open wars, and draw sometimes an utter ruin upon a state or
government” (Blazing 162, 202). During Cavendish’s time, arguments at the Royal Society, who swore by
their objectivity, sometimes did lead to factions and side-taking.

9

This will later be explored at length, especially in chapters three and four. Cavendish’ preference for
reason is made clear on many occasions: “Reason must judge, sense execute” (Observations 210).
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scholarly disputatiousness” (Revolution 134). Striving for social decorum and theoretical
consensus then became an important goal of experimentalists and mechanists, for through
it they could suggest that these philosophies removed the very human tendency to bring
emotion into natural philosophy and present the simple facts.
The issue of social decorum gave rise to a distinct rhetoric among some
experimentalists and mechanists, but their language style still retained some metaphors
that excluded women from participation in natural discovery. Royal Society Fellow
Thomas Sprat thought that the Royal Society could avoid disagreements through using
plain language that refrained from the rhetorical games so often employed in verbal
disputes (Lynch 167). Sprat claimed that the Royal Society was focused on things rather
than verbal disagreements (167). The attention to how language should and should not
be used in scientific discourse became an important issue in the Royal Society that
stemmed back to Bacon’s “non-alphabetic signs that […] represent[ed] ‘things and
notions’ directly without the mediation of words” (119). Focusing on things instead of
words was to end miscommunication and aid understanding. But despite several types of
languages proposed by Royal Society Fellows, it remained needful to communicate to the
outside world in a common language, in which case the Royal Society urged
communication with simple speech. This included an attempt to strip language of all of
its tropes and metaphors, which easily confused readers. Yet despite this attempt, several
metaphors remained. One important metaphor was extremely valuable to mechanist
philosophers, which consisted of describing various traits of nature in mechanical ways
or in terms of force. Another consisted of framing the male scientist in pursuit of female
nature.
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Shapin explicates these metaphors and shows that both were used to promote the
mechanist cause, which is why they were permitted in the program intended for plain
speech (Revolution 95). Although this program was meant to avoid differing opinions,
these metaphors were socially charged. In The Matter of Revolution, John Rogers
contends that Hobbes’ belief in brute force leading to social privilege was incorporated
into the mechanical philosophy and that “mechanism provided masculine dominance with
a powerful organizational sanction” (188). He explains that this may be why Cavendish
launches a critique, beginning in the year 1663, against mechanism and embraces
“animist materialism,” already outdated in the world of natural philosophy.
Rogers, along with Carolyn Merchant and Eve Keller, shows that to the
seventeenth-century scientist, “change in the world was often little more than the effect of
an implicitly masculine force of motion on the passive, even lifeless, elements of an
implicitly feminine matter” (186). So it becomes interesting that as Shapin explains that
Boyle’s mechanical philosophy had only ‘two grand principles,’ which were “matter and
motion,” we see that down at the very core of mechanical philosophy there is a gendering
of nature (Shapin Revolution 46).
Although the method to receive scientific knowledge in the Royal Society was
experimentalism, mechanical philosophy ruled in the interpretation of these observations.
William Lynch specifically shows that Digby had adapted alchemy to mechanical
principles, and “Evelyn’s reflections upon the ‘vegetative motions of plants’ took place in
the speculative mechanical philosophy that was intended by Boyle and the Royal Society
to encompass, rather than merely to replace, chemical explanations, by subordinating
them to the mechanical philosophy” (66). Through this translation of observations into
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the mechanical philosophy, we see that the experimentalists’ claim to complete
objectivity was beginning to crumble.
Lisa Anscomb emphasizes the Royal Society’s distrust of traditional rhetoric
because it relied on language for its own sake rather than logical judgment. Anscomb
describes at length the Royal Society’s use of metaphor, explaining that the Royal
Society did not disregard metaphor and other tropes for the ‘mathematical plainness’ of
speech that Thomas Sprat championed in his history of the Royal Society. Instead,
Anscomb shows, they engaged in a particular speech regarding the male scientist in
pursuit and mastery over female nature and that these metaphors, by their gendering,
excluded the female enquirer from scientific discourse (161). She shows, “the ‘new
scientist’ is presented as a virile suitor engaged in the pursuit and seduction of Nature
figured as a Woman” (168). Anscomb fairly balances her argument, addressing the
possibility that since the Royal Society’s gendered metaphors were “so prolific and
universal” that they were not seen as “excessive or indulgent, since they referred to
fundamental human and cosmic categories” (168). Anscomb argues that the metaphors
used by the Royal Society became part of propaganda that promoted the experimental,
and may we add mechanical, method.
The Royal Society quite frequently used the metaphor of the male scientist
pursuing female nature. Robert Hooke used it in his preface to Micrographia, in saying,
“the footsteps of Nature are to be trac’d, not only in her ordinary course, but when she
seems to be put to her shifts, to make many doublings and turnings, and to use some kind
of art in indeavouring [sic] to avoid our discovery” (n. pag.). Here we notice how nature
seems to possess a flirtatious art, being compared to a coy woman barely escaping
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entrapment by her lover. This metaphor remains intriguing for several reasons. It is
socially charged because it excludes women as the “hunters” of nature by turning the
relationship into a romantic chase with a male pursuer and female object. It also shows a
mechanist tendency to use force and technology to “trace” and entrap nature, dominating
it as a lover would entrap a coy temptress. At last it maintains an interesting irony in
suggesting that it is nature that is artificial in “using some kind of art,” instead of the
natural philosophers who employ technology to discover the true nature of the world.10
With its restraints on rhetoric, its use of technology, and the socially challenging
idea of trusting in personal experience, how was the experimental approach beneficial to
seventeenth-century natural philosophers? According to Shapin, “Reformed knowledge,
especially in its mechanical modes, was to be as technologically fertile as the Scholastic
alternative was evidently barren. Use was to be a reliable test of truth” (Revolution 140).
When Cavendish critiques the Royal Society and other mechanical philosophers for
merely dabbling in tricks and not producing anything useful (“to what purpose should a
man beat his brains, and weary his body with labours about that wherein he shall lose
more time, than gain knowledge?”), she may very well be critiquing the time spent on
10

Shapin shows that the idea of nature as artificer wasn’t new to seventeenth century mechanical
philosophers but originated as far back as Aristotle. He also explains that the artifice of nature, devised and
carried out in her plans, was seen as far superior to the artifice of humans. “It was impossible that humans
should compete with nature” (Revolution 31). What was different about the view in the seventeenth
century was that nature began to be subordinated to the level of humans. “Bacon made that rejection [of
the ancient distinction between the artifice of nature and the artifice of man] the basis for both a reformed
natural history—now to include the products of human artifice—and a more optimistic attitude toward the
potential of human artifice: ‘the artificial does not differ from the natural in form or essence… nor matters
it, provided things are put in the way to produce an effect, whether it be done by humans or otherwise’”
(Shapin Revolution 31).
The idea that the “art” of nature was equal to man-made creation is understandable in a certain light. As
Shapin explains, “The heat of the sun can be legitimately compared to terrestrial fire; the gold said to be
produced by the alchemist is the same as that found naturally in the earth; the physics appropriate to
understanding machines made by humans may be the same as that required for understanding celestial
motions…” (Revolution 32). As scientists viewed the creations of nature and the creations of humans, it
became apparent that even the greatest expanse of nature could be explained according to terrestrial and
man-made “micromachines.”
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such a debate against the ancients, as well as their method of merely gathering facts
(Observations 105). As we will explore further, Cavendish felt that experimentalism and
mechanism went too far in neglecting the essential role of reason, as well as the
knowledge passed down since ancient times. She compares her English contemporaries
to “[…] boys that play with water bubbles or fling dust into each other’s eyes […] for
wasting time with foolish sports; so those that addict themselves to unprofitable arts
spend more time than they reap benefit thereby” (Observations 52). Cavendish questions
what good experimental or mechanical observations are when they are mindlessly
recorded and left unfiltered by the rational mind, never creating meaning on a larger
sociopolitical scale.11 As we later examine Cavendish’s own natural philosophy, we will
11

Although in Cavendish’s writings it seems as if there is a constant battle between the proponents of
rational inquiry versus the proponents of experiment and observation, revisionist scholars show that
experimental philosophers actually attempted a synthesis of these two principles. Shapin explains that
Bacon rejected the ancients’ deductive tendency to use particulars only to draw sweeping generalizations
about nature and instead instituted induction, which sometimes lead to the “mindless gathering of facts”
(Revolution 92). Although this method was criticized, it was deemed as a break from the Scholastics and
previously popular methods of obtaining truth. William Lynch contends, “Historians often link the early
Society’s virtuosic pursuit of idle curiosities and its aversion to hypothesis and theory to a simplistic
Baconianism focusing entirely on the collection of facts. The effect of method, according to this
interpretation, is taken to preclude pursuit of a recognizably modern science” (Lynch 26). Of course
method was used in the process, as well as collaboration and reliance on testimony, as we have already
discussed. According to Lynch, “The ability to reproduce natural effects through disciplined art is the
ultimate test of the validity of knowledge for Bacon” (23). The key word here is disciplined.
Natural philosophers in the seventeenth century launched what they thought was a revolutionary approach
to science by using the instruments that artisans, members of the lower class, had been using and perfecting
for years. Learning to use this art to discover natural truths also took training and adherence to method.
“To the untutored sense, the moon looked no bigger than an apple pie and the sun appeared to go around
the earth. It was educated reason, not simple sense, that allowed moderns to ‘see’ the moon as very big and
the sun as still” (Shapin Revolution 93). It wasn’t just the “mindless gathering of facts” that these scientists
were after, and they realized the errors that could result from relying on the senses and experience without
contemplative thought. “Bacon also agreed with many other seventeenth-century natural philosophers that
the uninstructed senses were apt to deceive and that the senses needed to be methodically disciplined if they
were to yield that authentic factual stuff philosophical reason could work on” (Shapin Revolution 93).
Although this presents a more moderate view of experimental philosophy, it still has one major flaw. The
whole of nature is simply too vast to question, observe, and deduce knowledge from without extensive
training and discipline. Astronomy is quite a different discipline from botany and it would take several
lifetimes to master both, but reason is a more universal method (Lynch 60). This is why many in the
seventeenth century still preferred rationalism as a method of scientific inquiry. The mind, without being
tied down to the senses and extensive experiments, was freer to move quickly in examining nature in
various forms.
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see how Cavendish favors the subjectivity of her model and vouches for its utility in not
only the scientific but the sociopolitical realm.
Because the exclusion of women from the scientific community was not
necessarily biologically based but socially based, and because the language and
metaphors used by male natural philosophers were sometimes socially or politically
charged, it is evident that there was more at stake to a method of scientific inquiry than
outwardly claimed. After examining how existing epistemological theories relate to the
sociopolitical realm we begin to comprehend the important social, scientific, and political
framework within which Cavendish wrote Blazing World and Observations upon
Experimental Philosophy. We see that the newly prevailing methods of experimentalism
and mechanism, although attempting to fix some flaws in previous epistemological
methods, also disregarded beneficial elements of equally valid methods of inquiry,
especially with regard to reason. In addition, they set up a scientific scheme that carried
with it democratic implications, which were politically subversive and threatening to
Cavendish’s status as an aristocrat. These social and political implications were ones that
could not be ignored by the either “new” scientists or traditionalists, and as we explore
Cavendish’s theory in detail, we see further that natural philosophy cannot be left in an
isolated realm.
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CHAPTER TWO
Matter, Mechanism, and Metaphor
“I cannot believe that God should be the prime actual movement of all natural creatures,
and put all things into local motion, like as one wheel in a clock turns all the rest: for
God’s power is sufficient enough to rule and govern all things by an absolute will and
command […] and to impart self-motion to nature, to move according to his order and
decree, though in a natural way.”

—Cavendish, Observations

Although she knew several mechanist philosophers personally and was tutored in
contemporary scientific theory, Margaret Cavendish could never bring herself to accept
the whole of mechanist and atomist thought. She disagreed with the philosophical
underpinnings of mechanism’s emphasis on physical strength and force.1 She came to
oppose atomism as a scientific premise, claiming that atoms could not be indivisible nor
could countless independent atoms “agree” with each other long enough to constitute
natural elements. Instead she created her own theory, suggesting that nature is composed
of matter, continuous and in constant motion. This chapter summarizes the role of
rational, sensitive, and inanimate matter as the main parts of her theory of matter and
discusses the significance of her theory in opposition to Cavendish’s contemporaries on
not only scientific, but also metaphorical justifications. We will first examine her theory
of matter and contrast it with rising mechanist philosophy. We will then examine
Cavendish’s opposition to mechanism (as well as experimentalism) on metaphorical and
sociopolitical grounds.
Beginning with her Philosophical Fancies in 1653, Cavendish began to frame a
theory of matter later developed in Observations upon Experimental Philosophy and
1

As we will discuss with mechanist philosopher Thomas Hobbes.
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Blazing World. This theory of matter has been labeled as monist (meaning that nature
consists of one type of matter) and vitalist (meaning that matter has innate life and selfmotion).2 In her theory, the structure of matter is continuous, not atomic or particular. It
is animate and self-moving. It is sensitive and knowing, meaning that it has the ability to
perceive the movements of nature as a whole but ultimately controls its own movements.
Unlike the vitalism of some early modern philosophers, such as Henry Moore, it contains
no incorporeal qualities. She divides single matter into two degrees: animate and
inanimate matter, which coexist together. Animate matter consists of two sub-degrees
that work closely together: rational and sensitive. The matter is hierarchically organized,
with rational being the supreme sub-degree, followed by the sensitive sub-degree, and at
last the inanimate degree.
Cavendish’s later work, including Observations and Blazing World, moves away
from her earlier leanings toward atomism. She asserts that everything is made of one
kind of matter and that this matter is continuous and divisible. “There can be no atom,
that is, an indivisible body in nature” (Observations 125).3 Instead, each unit in nature
can be divided smaller and smaller, and even the least part would be a blending of the
animate and inanimate degrees of matter.
Cavendish employs several ways to illustrate how matter works in her theory.
One way is through metaphor. A figurative representation of a hierarchy of workers

2

Many critics have discussed Cavendish’s vitalism including Anna Battigelli, Margaret Cavendish and the
Exiles of the Mind (Lexington, KY: Kentucky UP, 1998) 49 and Lisa Sarasohn, “A Science Turned Upside
Down: Feminism and the Natural Philosophy of Margaret Cavendish.” Huntington Library Quarterly 17
(1984): 297. For Cavendish’s monism, see John Rogers, The Matter of Revolution: Science, Poetry, and
Politics in the Age of Milton.
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1996).
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This builds upon the a tradition in natural philosophy beginning with Aristotle.
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building a house is the most pervasive metaphor Cavendish uses to explain the degrees
and sub-degrees of matter in Observations.
For as in the exstruction of a house there is first required an architect or
surveyor, who orders and designs the buildings, and puts the labourers to
work; next the labourers or workmen themselves; and lastly the materials
of which the house is built: so the rational part, said they, in the framing of
natural effects, is as it were, surveyor or architect; the sensitive, the
labouring or working part; and the inanimate, the materials: and all these
degrees are necessarily required in every composed action of nature. (24)
The metaphor is a tidy way to explain the roles of the degrees and sub-degrees of matter,
which is why Cavendish uses the conceit frequently in her work.4 But if taken too
literally, the metaphor may confuse rather than clarify because it appears to suggest the
separation of the degrees of matter into three divergent matters. In Cavendish’s theory,
the parts of matter and their roles may be distinct, but the different parts of matter do not
create three different matters. Rational, sensitive, and inanimate matter are all part of the
one singular matter of nature: “I do not say that they are three distinct and several
matters; for as they do make but one body of nature, so they are also but one matter […]”
(Observations 206).

As the degrees and sub-degrees of matter intertwine together, they

compose the whole of nature as their roles complement each other.
Perhaps this concept is easier to understand when we view matter as a whole body
and the degrees of matter as systems that function differently within that body. Sensitive
matter is compared to our senses and nervous system of receptors and executors, which
receive information from inanimate matter and inform centers, or our brains (rational
4

In addition, see Observations 33 and 206.
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matter). These rational centers in turn process this information schematically and order
the executors (sensitive matter) to arrange, move, or otherwise direct crude body mass
(inanimate matter).
The first degree of matter, the animate degree, consists of both the rational and
sensitive sub-degrees of matter. Cavendish explains the animate degree as “nothing but
self-motion” (Observations 205). Self-motion, the ability of matter to direct its own
movements, is coupled with self-knowledge in animate matter, with the rational subdegree of matter having a finer sense of self-knowledge than the sensitive sub-degree.
This idea of self-motion is very important to Cavendish but was in no wise unique to her
theory alone. It follows the vitalist movement in showing that matter is self-determining.
It has its roots in classical philosophy and is relevant today in theoretical physics.5 That
Cavendish held to the theory of self-motion, even though it had fallen out of vogue,
attracts our attention because it was in direct conflict with the emerging mechanist
philosophy, which presented matter in motion as a reaction to force. Contemporaries
such as Thomas Hobbes sought to distinctly separate matter and motion from each other,
arguing that nature consisted only of the two qualities. Because of its separation of
matter and motion, some present-day scholars regard the mechanist philosophy as
masculine because it suggests that objects move in the direction of the strongest force,
privileging strength over self-direction. Cavendish makes her stance clear, “I do not
mean, that all actions are made by rote, and none by imitation; but, by voluntary actions I
5

In his cosmological argument, Plato’s distinguished two types of motion, motion forced on an object from
an external force, and motion from within an object. Aristotle believed that matter and motion were linked
and that a being without matter could have no motion of its own (thus God was the Unmoved Mover). In
post-Enlightenment times we began to understand motion as small particles (even mass-less particles) in
rapid motion. Nineteenth-century German chemist Wilhelm Ostwald again linked matter and motion as he
believed that all matter was energy, with energy being particles in motion. Albert Einstein’s equating mass
with energy (E=mc2) suggests that as critical matter increases, so does energy.
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understand self actions; that is, such actions whose principle of motion is within
themselves, and doth not proceed from such an exterior agent […]” (Observations 19).
According to her belief, matter moves because it wants to move, not because of an
outside intrusion that forces it into action. This idea will be explored later in this chapter
where we will examine Cavendish’s theory in relation to that of the mechanist
philosophy.
To Cavendish, even the smallest part of nature6 is actually a system of rational,
sensitive, and inanimate matter working together in a hierarchical balance. Animate
matter, found integrated into all parts of nature, is what gives nature freedom to direct
itself. Cavendish argues, “As infinite nature has an infinite self-motion and selfknowledge; so every part and particle has a particular and finite self-motion and selfknowledge, by which it knows itself, and its own actions, and perceives also other parts
and actions […]” (Observations 138). In Cavendish’s theory, nature orders itself through
the self-knowledge of each of its elements, and they in turn influence and interact with
each of the other parts based on knowledge, perception, and choice.
There are two sub-degrees of animate matter in this system, the higher and purer
being rational matter. These two sub-degrees work like systems of the body, with
rational matter functioning like the brain in the human body and the sensitive sub-degree
functioning as the rest of the nervous system. Cavendish clarifies this distinction, “As the
several degrees of matter are not several kinds of matter; so neither are rational and
sensitive knowledge, several kinds of self-knowledges, but only different degrees of one
self-knowledge,” suggesting that rational matter (the governing brain of Cavendish’s
6

The word smallest is used to here to refer to a very small sampling of nature. In Cavendish’s philosophy,
there cannot actually be an amount of nature that constitutes the smallest part because matter is continuous
and not particulate.
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material hierarchy) has simply a higher degree of knowledge than sensitive matter (the
rest of the nervous system) (Observations 161). Rational matter, as its name suggests, is
the reasoning sector of matter. It receives information from sensitive matter, and directs
sensitive matter to control the inanimate degree of matter. Cavendish explains,
[…T]he rational being so pure, fine and subtle, that it gave only directions
to the sensitive, and made figures in its own degree, left the working with
and upon the inanimate part, to the sensitive degree of matter, whose
office was to execute both the rational part’s design and to work those
various figures that are perceived in nature; and those three degrees were
so inseparably commixt in the body of nature, that none could be without
the other in any part or creature in nature […]. (Observations 24)
Rational matter is the head of the hierarchy in matter, and is left to think freely,
unencumbered by inanimate matter.
The sensitive sub-degree of matter is the cause of perceptions. It receives
information based on its experience with parts of nature to the extent that it interacts with
other elements. As with rational matter, it also has self-knowledge, but not to the same
degree. Cavendish asserts that sensitive matter gains self-knowledge at it remembers
perceptions through repetition and experience (Observations 149). The senses,
Cavendish asserts, are knowledgeable themselves. “Some learned conceive, that all
knowledge is in the mind, and none in the senses: For the senses, say they, present only
exterior objects to the mind; which sits as a judge in the kernel, or fourth ventricle of the
brain […] and judges them […] which shows, they are very dull servants; and I wonder
how they can inform the mind of what they do not know themselves” (Observations 153).
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Through this explanation, Cavendish shows that the mind can only gain its vast
knowledge through a system of senses or knowledgeable informers. Because of this
perception in sensitive matter, all degrees of matter are able to coordinate their actions
together just as the nervous system coordinates the commands of the brain with the mass
of the body (Observations 143).
The inanimate degree of matter is crude and unrefined, and for our purposes can
be compared to the critical mass of the body—the internal organs, bones, muscles, and
skin. Although animate matter has only two sub-degrees, rational and sensitive,
Cavendish argues inanimate matter has many sub-degrees such as “density, rarity,
softness, hardness, etc.,” essentially the physical qualities we normally ascribe to objects
in nature (Observations 30). Like the animate degree of matter, inanimate matter is selfknowing, but unlike animate matter it is not self-moving because it lacks perception.
“The rational parts are more agile, active, pure and subtle than the sensitive; but the
inanimate have no activity, subtlety and agility at all, by reason they want self-motion;
nor no perception, for self-motion is the cause of all perception” (Observations 25).
Since inanimate matter has no perception or self-motion, it requires the rational subdegree of matter to direct it and the sensitive sub-degree to move it.
Cavendish’s theory is not entirely new to seventeenth-century natural philosophy,
but does work against the some of the most popular theories of her day, including
mechanism. One area where Cavendish’s theory of matter contrasts sharply with her
mechanist contemporaries is with regard to motion and matter. According to Cavendish,
“Motion, being material and inseparable from matter, cannot be imparted without matter”
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(Observations 75). But even as she accepts some of her contemporary mechanists’ ideas,
she will not relent on this one.
I am of Descartes’ opinion, that the parts of matter may be made bigger or
less by addition or subtraction of other parts; but I cannot yield to him
when he says, that motion may be swifter and slower by addition given to
the movement by other contiguous bodies more swiftly moving, or by
subduction of it by bodies slower moved, and that motion may be
transferred out of one body into another. (Observations 200)
To Cavendish, matter is inherently self-moving, and motion cannot be transferred without
matter being transferred.
But Cavendish doesn’t always oppose the mechanists. Through examining
Cavendish's relation to mechanical thought, Sara Hutton redeems Cavendish from some
negative readings of her resistance to mechanical philosophy. Hutton suggests that
Cavendish’s ideas on mechanical philosophy weren’t pure resistance, but a synthesis of
old and new ways of examining the universe. Like Hobbes, as well as other mechanical
philosophers, Cavendish believes that nature is made of matter and, as her
contemporaries, she describes phenomena “in terms of the size, shape, and position of
matter in motion” (423). In addition, the Empress’ scientists in Blazing World account
for natural phenomena such as the formation of ice or of lightning in strictly Hobbesian
terms (Hutton 425). Like Hobbes and others, Cavendish argues that experimental and
mechanical philosophies are only needful as they benefit humankind. It is particularly in
relation to motion that Cavendish disagrees with the mechanist mode of thought,
suggesting that her opposition to the theory is at least partially social.
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Eileen O’ Neil shows that Cavendish opposes the causational theory underlining
mechanical philosophy. Because mechanical philosophers explain natural change as
corporeal bodies impacting one another, they often use terms of motion and force
(Observations xxix).

To the mechanists, motion may be transferred from one body to

another. Cavendish claims that the transfer of motion through the impact of corporeal
matter is an insufficient and incorrect explanation for all natural changes (xxix). O’ Neil
explains, “Cavendish is attempting to replace a transfer model of change, where discrete
parts of nature give and receive motion, with a model of the vital agreement and harmony
in a unified organism” (xxxii). To Cavendish, motion can only be transferred from one
object to the next if the first object gives up some of its matter at the same time. Instead,
motion is inherent in the object itself, and other objects may only “occasion” the object to
move through the “perceptions” of sensitive matter.
Cavendish illustrates the principle of “occasioning” by showing a man moving a
string or ball with his hand, “[…] the string or ball is no more sensible of the motion of
the hand, than the hand is of the motion of the string or ball; but the hand is only an
occasion that the string or ball moves thus or thus” (Observations 140). O’ Neil
clarifies, “It is the nature of the ball itself, and the force inherent in it, that is the principal
and perfect cause of the ball’s motion” (Observations xxxii). An object only moves in
accordance with another through such an “occasion,” giving every object its own organic
self-determination. Cavendish further explains this idea of matter moving more in
harmony with the rest of nature rather than being inevitably moved upon by force, “And
hence I conclude, that no particular parts are bound to certain particular actions, no more

27

than nature herself, which is self-moving matter” (138). In contrast to motion being the
result of force, to Cavendish it is the product of choice.
This self-motion and “occasioning” obviously pose some difficulties as well as
some misreadings of Cavendish. John Rogers calls Cavendishean choice a type of
consent because it seems to rise out of an obligation (206). This isn’t necessarily the best
reading of Cavendish. Cavendish asserts that in most cases, an object will move as
another “occasions” it because nature is usually very ordered and systematic. But
sometimes parts of matter disagree, which cause irregularities in nature.
Thus the sensitive and rational motions do oftentimes cross and oppose
each other: for, although several parts are united in one body, yet are they
not always bound to agree to one action […] for, were there no
disagreement between them, there would be no irregularities, and
consequently no pain or sickness, nor no dissolution of any natural figure.
And such agreement and disagreement, is not only betwixt the rational and
sensitive parts, but also betwixt the rational and rational, the sensitive and
sensitive. (Observations 145)
Through this explanation, Cavendish accounts for irregularities that are much more
difficult for the mechanists to elucidate. It explains anything from biological
irregularities, like sickness or congenital disorders, to differences in physical properties
of different materials, such as wood’s resistance to heat versus copper’s conductivity. In
Cavendish’s theory, some of these unexpected results come from an instance when one of
the degrees of matter fails to cooperate with the others. For example, if sensible matter,
through its self-knowledge and self-motion, forgets to or decides not to inform rational
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matter of its perceptions of another object, then irregularities in nature will produce
unexpected results.
Many scholars have pointed to Cavendish’s tendency to view scientific theory as
a type of political or gendered metaphor, and suggest that Cavendish’s material theory,
including the self-motion of matter, favors her political and gendered predispositions.
This is not too surprising, as her contemporaries often did the same. Rogers accuses the
mechanist philosophers, such as Hobbes, of loading their theory with gendered and
political implications. He explains,
It is difficult to imagine anything but the most patriarchal conclusion
derivable from Hobbes’ ruthless, scientific view of the priority of physical
strength. Mechanism provided masculine dominance with a powerful
organizational sanction, and […] it was precisely the untenable nature of
such conclusions that impelled Cavendish to distance herself from the
mechanical explanation of natural change. (188)
Indeed, Hobbes’ prioritizing of brute force in nature is interpreted by Cavendish to have
masculine implications, and she implies that it reveals men’s ambition and pride,
But I perceive man has a great spleen against self-moving corporeal
nature, although himself is a part of her, and the reason is his ambition; for
he would fain be supreme, and above all other creatures, as more towards
a divine nature: he would be a God, if arguments could make him such, at
least God-like, as is evident by his fall, which came merely from an
ambitious mind of being like God. (Observations 209)
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Cavendish’s resistance to the idea of masculine force and domination shows that in
seventeenth-century England natural philosophy was socially charged. The rising
philosophies of mechanism and experimentalism changed the way that people were
accustomed to viewing not only nature, but each other and society as well. And as for the
philosophers themselves, their beliefs and ability (or lack thereof) to convince others to
stand beside them in promoting their chosen theory had sometimes strong social
implications and consequences.
One implication of the mechanical and experimental philosophies was religious in
nature. The belief circulated through experimentalist circles and the Royal Society that
through dominating nature, scientists could redeem mankind from its current state of
misery. Cavendish refused to believe this promise and rejected Robert Hooke’s claim
[T]hat experiments were the only true foundation for a philosophy of
nature, that the society’s experimental results were certain,
incontrovertible truth, and that their discoveries would bring practical
benefits as great as the inventions of printing and gunpowder, producing
revolutions in the arts of navigation and agriculture, and restoring
mankind to its pristine knowledge and happiness before the fall. (Whitaker
280)
Cavendish believes it is precisely this ambitious drive which demonstrates the sinful
nature of humans that led to the fall. This anxiety over the issue of the fall and human
redemption directly relates to the political turmoil in the seventeenth century with the rise
of Puritan and parliamentarian millennial philosophy, a philosophy that worried royalists
such as Cavendish. Katie Whitaker shows that the experimenters’ philosophy in several
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ways put the old royalists on their guard, including its “grandiose utopian promises of
almost limitless human improvement—which smacked of the Interregnum
parliamentarian reformers who had indeed inspired many of them” and that the royalists
“were angered by the Royal Society’s success in gaining royal patronage, and the rapid
career advancement” of its members in the church and government (281). From this we
see that one’s allegiance to certain scientific theories sometimes led to the making or
breaking of social and political alliances. For some royalists, this meant that in order to
reject political alliance with the parliamentarian and Puritan force, they had to reject the
more popular theories of experimentalism and mechanism (along with their metaphors
for society and their millennial promises) espoused by those who sought for a more
democratic England. Scientific theory was not always solely based on what seemed the
most rational and correct way to understand and discover nature, but became a factor of
social and political association.
The link between each scientific theory’s governing metaphors and the
sociopolitical realm, suggested in the last chapter, is worth examining in further detail as
it relates to Cavendish. Even though the Royal Society sought to eliminate rhetorical
tricks that would complicate language, they still used metaphors that promoted their
theories (Harvey’s describing the heart as a pump helps promote the mechanist
philosophy and Hooke’s description of nature as a coy lady compares the scientists
pursuit of nature as a man pursuing a female love interest).7 Despite the seventeenthcentury shift in England to present scientific ideas more clearly, Cavendish’s writings are
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Stephen Shapin, in The Scientific Revolution and John Rogers in The Matter of Revolution both show how
the use of metaphor by mechanist and experimental philosophers promoted their theories and were often
politically or socially charged.
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no stranger to metaphor, which she often uses to show the link between nature (as she
sees it) and society and politics.
Cavendish first began using scientific theories as metaphors for the sociopolitical
realm when she was an atomist. Battigelli dates Cavendish’s atomist roots to 1645, when
Cavendish and her husband were at the center of a scientific salon in Paris where leading
thinkers, including Gassendi and Descartes, discussed and reviewed their ideas on natural
philosophy (45).8 It was from socializing in this circle that Cavendish was introduced to
mechanism and atomism, philosophies that were associated with each other on
microscopic and macroscopic levels, which Cavendish at first accepted and later rejected
for her monistic and vitalistic theory of matter. Her interest in atomism lead to her
“fascination with a metaphor that served to explain political and psychological conflict;
by questioning the validity of sensory perception, atomism helped caution against the
kind of dogmatic certainty that to Cavendish’s mind had fueled the English civil wars”
(Battigelli 49). Lisa Sarasohn also shows that Cavendish likely made the switch from
atomism to her vitalist theory of matter for political reasons. Cavendish saw each atom
having a free will with no controlling force as politically disastrous (297). Battigelli
agrees, “She turned to studies of natural philosophy because, like many seventeenthcentury thinkers, she read the new scientific systems as metaphors for the political chaos
of her world” (Battigelli 3). Indeed the atomism as presented in Poems and Fancies
details how atoms form factions and have an individual will of their own. In “A War
With Atoms,” Cavendish writes,
Some factious Atomes will agree; combine
They strive some form’d Body to unjoyne
8

As does Katie Whitaker in Mad Madge (81-103).
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The Round beate out the Sharp: the Long
The Flat do fight withal, thus all go wrong.
Here Cavendish suggests that if nature were constructed of atoms, democratic in body,
they would act similar to people in combining together in warring factions, similar to the
factions that exiled the Cavendish’s and other royalists during the civil war. When
Cavendish later begins to form her theory of matter with its strict hierarchy of three
degrees, we see it is probable to also view this theory as socially charged as it mirrors
both the class layers of English society and the political structure in Blazing World.
By the time Cavendish writes Observations and Blazing World, her new theory of
matter (in place of her old atomism) resolves the problem of democratic disorder and
presents nature as an orderly monarch, whose reason governs her actions and makes
sense of the natural world: “though the actions of nature were different and opposite to
each other, yet they did cause no disturbance in nature, but they were ruled and governed
by nature’s wisdom; for nature being peacable in herself, would not suffer her actions to
disturb her government” (Observations 34). Noticing a similar trend in Cavendish’s
writings, Battigelli asserts that Cavendish gives up atomism in 1665 (just a year before
she published Observations and Blazing World) because to Cavendish
[S]uch a system [of atoms] would result in ‘an infinite and eternal
disorder’ […]. The dance of atoms was unlikely, in her mind, to result in a
stable universe governed by definable laws; furthermore, by positing a
material system in which any given atom had power equal to that of any
other atom, atomism threatened to level the hierarchical order that
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Cavendish felt was necessary if anarchy was to be avoided in both
material and political systems. (62)
This hierarchical structure is precisely what Cavendish develops in Observations and
dramatizes in Blazing World. Battigelli reminds us that even though Cavendish finds a
more ordered way of describing nature, she continued to view scientific theories as
metaphors for the sociopolitical realm. “But although she rejected atomism as a theory of
matter in 1665, she retained it throughout her life as a metaphor for the body politic and
for the mind,” especially with regard to the dangers Cavendish saw in democracy and
collaboration (Battigelli 63).
Some may question why Cavendish gives up the theory of atomism and replaces
it with a theory of matter that is still, as Rogers shows, very democratic. For example,
although he acknowledges that Cavendish has no sympathy, hidden or expressed, for
Puritan politics, Rogers connects Cavendish’s theory of matter with the Protestant
doctrine that each individual is endowed with reason and right to receive inspiration, just
as each division of matter contains a part of rational matter within it that exercises free
will and governs the other two kinds of matter (198). Cavendish’s theory does resemble
this to a degree in saying that even the smallest part in nature is endowed with a system
of matter governed by rational matter, not to mention that it also allows all degrees of
matter the concept of self-knowledge and gives each a distinct dependence on each other.
But even though all degrees of matter have self-knowledge and work in a mutually
dependant “society,” the rational sub-degree still is the governing part of matter.
Although Cavendish envisions a living matter with free will, she hierarchically structures
it to mimic her ordered society.
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The ambiguity regarding this system, which can be seen as both democratic and
hierarchical, has confused and even disappointed some present-day critics. David
Norbrook explains why this issue is more complicated.
[I]t seems so hard to categorize Cavendish in political terms, with such
radical shifts between an extraordinary openness of imagination and high
Toryism. As with later Nietzschean theories of social construction, the
arguments can easily cut in two ways. It sometimes seems to be assumed
that if it is recognized that a cultural form is constructed then the scales
will fall from everyone’s eyes and emancipation will follow; but then as
now it is perfectly possible to see an inequality as constructed and still opt
to maintain it, the more so if skepticism about universals makes it hard to
formulate an alternative ground for critique. (184)
Norbrook suggests that even though Cavendish recognized that there were artificial
constructions linked to the way early moderns saw science and society doesn’t mean that
Cavendish saw all of these constructions as necessarily bad. Recognizing that science
could be used as a metaphor for society, Cavendish could choose which metaphors suited
her social beliefs and use those over the ones that were not favorable. Thus, she could
promote metaphors and natural philosophy that supported the idea that natural
philosophers could be female as well as male while at the same time allowing her to
support England’s class system through a hierarchically structured theory of matter.
This issue becomes especially interesting when we look at Cavendish’s theory
through a feminist lens. Rogers notes that Cavendish’s theory is constructed on more
than philosophical and political views; it is driven by Cavendish’s belief in the equality of
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men’s and women’s minds. He explains, “In Cavendish’s case, it has been argued that
she turned towards a more vitalistic form of atomism because its gender connotations
were less patriarchal, and this has been linked with a more general postmodern feminist
critique of empirical science” (188). Rogers suggests that she does this not along
political lines, but against the sexual subjection of patriarchal society and the supreme
rule of brute force evident in mechanical philosophy. He argues, “The egalitarian
infusion of matter with motion, or the conjecture of innumerable agents of infallible
reason, may have emerged originally from a radical politics of dissent” (199).
Cavendish’s adoption of the old idea of motion inherent in matter is “egalitarian” because
it suggests that matter is preferred in nature and that there is no such thing as “force.”
The mechanist belief that active force is what compels passive matter to move reinforced
traditional ways of viewing the active male/passive female relationship. Because
Cavendish agrees with Descartes that sex is not linked to the mind, and therefore
irrelevant regarding rational powers, her theory of matter metaphorically gives women
just as much power as men, while still maintaining a place in a traditional hierarchy of
social class.
In her gendered metaphors we see more clearly Cavendish’s view of gender
relations and science as her metaphors link her natural philosophy with the social realm.
Rogers explains, “Cavendish shares […] a drive to marshal images from natural
philosophy as an organizational foundation for her beliefs about human society and, more
specifically, about the interaction of men and women” (Rogers 185). Eve Keller also
examines Cavendish’s gendered metaphor and deems it a type of feminism, though not in
strictly present-day terms: “An assessment of Cavendish’s science […] allows us to
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recognize in her works an unusual awareness of the constitutive role of gender relations
in science. This awareness may not suffice to deem her a feminist, but it does forcefully
anticipate what has become a defining feature of feminist analysis” (Keller 452). Lisa
Anscomb engages in a lengthy discussion over Cavendish’s frequently used gendered
metaphors, despite her attempts to be ‘plainly and vulgarly expressed,’ as was the fashion
of her day. But to Anscomb the figurative language Cavendish uses “deviated from the
drive for mastery” propagated by her contemporaries (162).9 Yet it is not the supposed
lack of refinement in Cavendish’s metaphors that is the key point. Cavendish’s metaphors
altered from her contemporaries, but in deliberate ways that parodied those of her
contemporaries or supported her own scientific premises.
Indeed, the differences in Cavendish’s gendered metaphors are worth examining.
Instead of portraying nature as a coy woman pursued by the male scientist, as Hooke’s
metaphor does, Cavendish’s gendered metaphors were less promiscuous, emphasizing
positive feminine traits. Cavendish records in Observations,
9

Anscomb clarifies Cavendish’s approach as one that didn’t worry so much about style as the thought
process (171). This is evident in Cavendish’s confession that she preferred not to take much time in
revising her works because it hinders the thought process. Of this she says in her husband’s biography, “I
want also the skill of Scholarship in true writing, I did many times not peruse the Copies that were
transcribed, lest they should disturb my following conceptions” (qtd. in Anscomb 174). Anscomb showed
that Cavendish’s contemporaries could not accept this kind of writing. “Cavendish’s reliance on gendered
metaphor and the metaphoricity of her own gender was a strategy which could not be accepted by a society
which championed the masculinity of straightforward language, plain and unadulterated, even while it
denied its own defining use of tropes” (164).
Richard Nate’s article, “‘Plain and Vulgarly Express’d’: Margaret Cavendish and the Discourse of New
Science” begins with a brief history detailing the Royal Society’s preference of things over words and
asserts that its members marked their discourse with a gender-biased rhetoric, not necessarily when
discussing their observations, but more often when writing about science—when explaining its functions,
advantages, or discussing general principles (408). In reviewing Sprat’s history, Nate says that he contrasts
“the male scientist’s active role with the passive role of female nature, but [Sprat] also describes the
‘Masculine Arts of Knowledge’ as a positive alternative to the ‘Feminine Arts of Pleasure’” (408). He
shows how Cavendish progressively attempted to make her works clearer to the fashion of the time. He
gives an example from Blazing World, where the Empress’s orators, the parrot-men, fail from muddling
their discourse. Nate shows that however subversive Cavendish is to the scientific modes of her time, she
isn’t willing to question the new linguistic norms (412). While Nate is right to trace the influence of the
new attitudes toward language in Cavendish’s own writing, he doesn’t examine her use of gendered
metaphors as continued resistance to the Royal Society’s linguistic project.
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Nature being a wise and provident lady, governs her parts very wisely,
methodically, and orderly: Also, she is very industrious, and hates to be
idle, which makes her employ her time as a good housewife does, in
brewing, baking, churning, spinning, sowing, etc. […]. But if anyone
would take delight in such things, my opinion is, that our female sex
would be fittest for it […] they would prove good experimental
philosophers and inform the world how to make artificial snow, by their
creams, or possets beaten into froth […]. (105-06)
This metaphor seems a bit overdone in its elevated appearance of a housewife’s duties,
and Cavendish probably did this on purpose. As Brandie Siegfried shows in “Anecdotal
and Cabalistic Forms in Observations upon Experimental Philosophy,” Cavendish often
uses gendered metaphor to mimic those of her male contemporaries (such as Hooke,
Digby, and Glanvill) in burlesque fashion (2, 5). But this parody writing does more than
point out the humor of the overly obvious gendered writing of male scientists; at the same
time it addresses the serious issue of the social and intellectual exclusion of women in
natural philosophy in England. Cavendish’s metaphor doesn’t exclude male natural
philosophers on account of their sex as Hooke’s metaphor excludes females because the
metaphor focuses on nature’s domesticity (an artificially acquired quality) instead of
nature’s sexuality (an intrinsic trait). Instead it suggests that women would be more
suited for experimental philosophy because their experience has already lead them to
imitate nature in the kitchen, a trait that men could learn if they wished. On another
level, it dismisses the “serious” experiments of the experimental philosophers as trivial
actions akin to the whipping of cream by women, thus bringing both sexes to the same
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plane. This metaphor shows that for Cavendish natural philosophy cannot be separated
from the social realm or vice versa, for the issue of who is best suited to discover nature
and bear testimony is inherently linked to the method of inquiry.
Cavendish is working on two different levels in constructing her theory of matter.
On the one hand, she is ordering the universe with priority given to reason by placing
rational matter at the top of the material hierarchy. To Cavendish’s mind, this is the most
logically sound theory as it allows for nature to be a constantly changing body, both selfmoving and self-knowing. On the other hand, she constructs her material theory to
coincide with her viewpoint regarding gender and politics. We see how Cavendish, in the
style of her contemporaries, uses gendered metaphors on both a small and large scale in
discussing natural philosophy to promote a position that favors her unique position as a
female aristocrat. Cavendish forfeited her allegiance to atomism to form a theory which
mimics the desired social structure. We are now at a point to examine specifically this
hierarchical order of matter, particularly the scientific, social, and political motivations
behind Cavendish’s placement of reason at the head of her hierarchy. Through
examining this theory on these two levels, we come to appreciate a complexity if ideas
formed by an aristocratic woman seeking to enter the arena of scientific discussion, a
realm previously closed to most of the female sex.
Through examining the fundamentals of Cavendish’s theory of matter, we realize
that to Cavendish (and to many of her male contemporaries) natural philosophy carries
with it social and political connotations. Cavendish is placed in a unique social position
as both an aristocrat and a woman, and her carefully constructed theory works
metaphorically to sustain and build her position in both situations. Through arguing that
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matter and motion are inseparable, Cavendish is able to provide an alternative to the
mechanists’ favoring of masculine strength and brute force. Her hierarchical structure in
the theory of matter mimics a structured social society, suggesting that a structure of
monarchy, aristocracy, and commoners is natural because even the smallest piece of
nature contains a similar structure. When these two points are merged, we begin to see
that Cavendish’s theory, especially regarding the rational degree of matter, is key to
defending not only her philosophical, but also sociopolitical stance. Because rational
matter is the highest degree, and because all people, regardless of gender, have access to
rational faculties, Cavendish suggests that men and women have an equal space for
scientific inquiry, for even the smallest part of nature tells us this is so.
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CHAPTER THREE
Reason, Fancy, and Rational Matter
“But seeing that in this age, sense is more in fashion than reason, it is no wonder there are
so many irregular opinions and judgments amongst men. However, although it be the
mode, yet I, for my part, shall not follow it; but leaving to our moderns, their
experimental or mode philosophy, built upon deluding art, I shall addict myself to the
study of contemplative philosophy, and reason shall be my guide”
—Cavendish, Observations
Because Cavendish places rational matter in the highest place in her model of
matter, above sensitive and inanimate matter, it is evident that Cavendish prefers the
rational faculties above those of the senses and highly values the functions of the mind
including the abilities to reason, imagine, and contemplate. This chapter furthers the
discussion of how Cavendish uses science on a sociopolitical plane by focusing on a part
of her theory: rational matter and the faculties of the mind. In addition to this
exploration, this chapter examines how Cavendish’s theory is evident directly and
figuratively in Blazing World, and how in this fictional narrative Cavendish again
discusses science on both philosophical and sociopolitical levels. Because rational matter
is defined as the highest and most refined part of matter, Cavendish’s theory has strong
social implications and creates a place for women to participate in the discourse of
natural philosophy.
In Blazing World, Cavendish classifies reason, fancy, and imagination under
rational matter. In her preface, “To the Reader,” Cavendish brings these elements
together: “By reason I understand a rational search and enquiry into the causes of natural
effects; and by fancy a voluntary creation and production of the mind, both being effects,
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or rather actions of the rational parts of matter […]” (Blazing 123-24). By observing the
faculties of the mind as parts of matter, we see that to Cavendish the human body has its
own hierarchy symbolizing the organization of her material theory. The functions of the
mind are actions of the rational sub-degree of matter. The mind is informed by the five
senses, which are part of sensitive matter, and the physical mass of the body is included
in inanimate matter. According to Cavendish, the parts of the body are figuratively
governed by the various degrees of matter. These parts of matter are not entirely
separated out in the body, but as in all of nature, each part of the body is made of
complete matter, which means that each part of the body has rational, sensitive, and
inanimate matter intermixed. The body becomes another metaphor for Cavendish to
explain her theory of matter.
As Cavendish shows that reason and fancy are located in the human mind above
all the rest of the body and its senses, we observe the importance of these two concepts in
Cavendish’s work. But first, it is important to clarify what Cavendish means exactly
when using these terms.1 To Cavendish, reason can be further defined as a serious
inquiry into natural philosophy. She shows this in her preface to Blazing World, entitled
“To the Reader,” where she clearly distinguishes her writings in Observations on
Experimental Philosophy from those in Blazing World, calling the first “serious
philosophical contemplations” that result from “motions of reason” and the second “a

1

Her definitions for reason, fancy, and imagination have a slightly different spin than the closest Oxford
English Dictionary definitions of Cavendish’s time. The OED explains that reason during the early
modern period was often defined as the “intellectual power or faculty (usually regarded as characteristic of
mankind, but sometimes also attributed in a certain degree to the lower animals) which is ordinarily
employed in adapting thought or action to some end; the guiding principle of the human mind in the
process of thinking” (“Reason,” def. III10a).
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work of fancy” (Blazing 123). To Cavendish, these types of contemplations, like those
found in Observations, consist of mental discourse.
When I say, that ‘discourse shall sooner find out nature’s corporeal
figurative motions, than art shall inform the senses,’ by discourse I do not
mean speech, but an arguing of the mind, or a rational enquiry into the
causes of natural effects; for discourse is as much as reasoning with
ourselves; which may very well be done without speech or language, as
being only an effect or action of reason. (Observations 14, emphasis
added)
Perhaps Cavendish’s belief in the merits of discussion with oneself is why we see the two
characters in Blazing World that represent Cavendish herself, the Empress and the
Duchess of Newcastle, engage in discourse and different points of view from time to
time, parodying the discussions that Cavendish may have had with herself while refuting
and drawing on current philosophies to form her theory of matter.
Cavendish includes such a discourse at the beginning of Observations, entitled
“An Argumental Discourse” which is essentially an argument that Cavendish has
between what she labels her “previous” and “latter” thoughts. In this discourse,
Cavendish first explains the degrees of matter and then affirms that “nature was a selfmoving body, and all her parts and creatures were so too” (24). In creating a
conversation with these two trains of thought that assert and the object to her
philosophical opinions, Cavendish uses her rational faculties not only to apprehend the
objections of her contemporaries to her theory of matter, but adds something more as
well. Instead of laying out experiments, results, and endless facts as the experimental
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philosopher might while recording his method and keeping records, Cavendish’s record
of her discourse in her mind allows the reader to see first hand the process of reason at
work in scientific inquiry in addition to experimentalism. Although contemporary
experimentalists also recorded their thought processes, Cavendish omitting the endless
facts, while leaving her method open to contemporary criticism, emphasizes reason as the
most important element in the epistemological process. The written discourse is
Cavendish’s way of recording the rational process, akin to the reports and observations
recorded according to the experimental process published so prolifically during the time,
such as Hooke’s Micrographia.
Alongside reason, fancy is likewise important in Blazing World. Since Cavendish
distinguishes between fancy and reason, it is helpful to refer to the Oxford English
Dictionary again in search for early modern usage of fancy. In the closest definition to
Cavendish’s, the OED defines fancy and compares it to imagination:
In early use synonymous with imagination […]. The process, and the
faculty, of forming mental representations of things not present to the
senses […]. In later use the words fancy and imagination (esp. as
denoting attributes manifested in poetical or literary composition) are
commonly distinguished: fancy being used to express aptitude for the
invention of illustrative or decorative imagery, while imagination is the
power of giving to ideal creations the inner consistency of realities.
(“Fancy,” def. 4a)
Fancy and imagination, as defined by the OED, are both clearly functions of the mind, as
is reason. Together all three originate from the rational process and refer to rational
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matter. Understanding how fancy differs from reason helps clarify how Blazing World
generally differs from Observations. Blazing World is intentionally fantastical in
combining both elements of fancy and imagination, and it differs drastically from its
more rational companion Observations. It appears from the onset that fancy and
imagination are incorporated far more frequently than reason in the scientific utopia. Yet
this is not actually the case. Cavendish in fact incorporates fancy and imagination into
her rational framework in Blazing World, using her newly imagined world to figuratively
display her theory of matter within the bounds of fancy, and framing the philosophical
discussions in the new world after discussions and opinions expressed in physical reality.
The reality of the physical world is the one on which Cavendish based her writings in
Observations, thus requiring her to call upon fancy and imagination to discuss the
figurative and hypothetical in Blazing World.
A good place to start examining how Cavendish uses fancy and reason in Blazing
World is to examine the text for evidence of her theory of matter. At first, Cavendish
seems to tell her readers not to expect that the “serious” philosophical discussion in
Observations (where her theory of matter is set forth) will have any heavy bearing on her
fictional narrative, and we might prematurely conclude that her theory of matter ends
within the genre of scientific treatise. She claims her narrative Blazing World is intended
merely to “divert [her] studious thoughts […] and to delight [her] reader with variety”
(Blazing 124). She says that she chose the subject of her fiction as an appropriate
companion piece to her Observations, to which it is attached. She explains, “the end of
reason, is truth; the end of fancy, is fiction” and therefore, claims that her narrative,
though philosophical in part, is not to be taken as a serious scientific discourse (123).
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Further examination, however, reveals that this is not her true intention for
Blazing World. Her joining it to her scientific treatise, combined with the lengthy
discussions on natural philosophy within the narrative that mimic her writings in
Observations (shown in detail in the following chapter), strongly hints that the discussion
of her theory of matter and her critique of experimental philosophy is continued from her
Observations into the Blazing World, despite the change in genre. But not only is the
philosophical discussion continued into Blazing World, it also advances the conversation
in ways that Cavendish is unable to do in Observations. Eve Keller supports this claim as
she also feels that Blazing World is quite important for revealing the implications of
Cavendish’s natural philosophy as revealed in Observations:
When it is considered in light of her Observations, the Blazing World is
routinely treated as Cavendish’s apologetic retreat: unable to make a
believable mark in the ‘real’ and difficult world of fact, the argument goes,
Cavendish escaped into the easy world of fiction. But to my mind, the
Blazing World actually continues the critique of experimental science
begun in the Observations, though with some important differences: like
the philosophical text, Cavendish’s vision of Paradise, the capital of her
utopian society, deconstructs the assumptions and claims about nature,
knowledge and the self that implicitly or explicitly pervade the new
science project; but the Blazing World also demonstrates—as the
Observations does not—Cavendish’s asymmetrical deployment of class
and gender as categories of critique. (Keller 459)
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Without Blazing World, the discussion begun in Observations would not be complete.
Through transporting her scientific discussion into fictional narrative, Cavendish is able
to discuss her theory and its implications through fictional politics and society, thus
bringing her theory, through figurative representation and fiction, into the sociopolitical
realm.
Cavendish’s preface to Blazing World sets up the expected level of philosophical
critique in her narrative. She explains that Blazing World is divided into three parts: “the
first part whereof is romancical, the second philosophical, and the third is merely fancy”
(124). Cavendish combines fantasy and natural philosophy (i.e. “fancy” and “reason,”
respectively), in Blazing World, and in so doing initially distracts the reader from her
forwardness as an English woman publishing her philosophical observations, a privilege
most often left to the men. But Blazing World does more than serve as a distraction to
Cavendish’s awkwardness in entering a realm generally reserved for men. It is much
more than a diversion to her “studious thoughts” or simple “variety” to the reader. It also
functions to dramatize Cavendish’s natural philosophy as presented in Observations. It
takes her theory, personifies its hierarchy in its fictional characters, and through a
narrative line shows how the parts of matter function together.
Through Cavendish herself we see a direct connection between Observations and
Blazing World when she explains that she publishes the two texts together “as two worlds
[joined] at the ends of their poles” (Blazing 124). Through this image the two worlds of
her narrative become metaphors for the two written works, both created out of the
rational faculty: the first for philosophical contemplation and the second for its figurative
implementation of the philosophies of the first. In this manner, Cavendish links her
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theory of matter directly to Blazing World. Speaking of her new world, she explains,
“This world… is composed of the most pure, that is, the rational parts of matter, which
are the parts of my mind” (Blazing 224). Using this reference to rational matter,
Cavendish shows us how Blazing World was created as a fictional text in accordance with
her theory. Cavendish is optimistic in her ability to use her concept of rational matter and
reason in order to transcend this world into higher mental worlds where utopias, such as
her Blazing and Philosophical worlds (both worlds described in the text), are created.
While contemporary mechanists, such as Hobbes, use natural philosophy to triumph over
the fallacies of human nature, Cavendish uses her understanding of matter, especially
rational matter, to apply it to the transcendence of the mind, proving not that mind is over
matter, but that mind is the purest and most elevated form of matter.
The links between Cavendish’s concept of rational matter and its implementation
in the text of Blazing World are more subtle and symbolic. One item that suggests that
Cavendish’s preferential placement of rational matter is carried from Observations to
Blazing World is the pattern of hierarchy that appears in her writing, especially with
regard to social class. Because Cavendish’s theory of matter is presented in hierarchical
form of rational, sensitive, and inanimate matter, examining other three-part hierarchies
in Blazing World and contemplating whether or not they correlate to her theory of matter
yields us a distinct figurative dramatization of Cavendish’s hierarchical system laid out in
Observations.
We are not the first to examine three-part hierarchies in Cavendish’s writings.
David Norbrook shows that Cavendish incorporates a three-part hierarchy into her
writings to relate to the sociopolitical realm. Norbrook explains that in the preface of her
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husband’s biography, Cavendish uses a “top-down model of political power and virtue.”
He explains this concept of a Cavendishean hierarchy that
[D]raws a distinction between three kinds of history: a general history,
which is democratic, the history of a particular nation, which is
aristocratic—and also potentially subversive because it draws attention to
factions and revives old quarrels—and a particular history, which is
monarchical. Cavendish’s history of her husband falls into the third
category: her focus is entirely on his actions and character. All other
characters are shadowy: this reflects […] her belief in a world where the
lower orders follow the lead from above. (195)
This observation is important to our discussion because through it we are able to
recognize a similar “top-down” model (“where the lower orders follow the lead from
above”) in Cavendish’s theory of matter. Using this metaphor, rational matter is the
commanding monarch of the theory of matter, while sensitive matter is the aristocracy,
needing the guidance and knowledge of the monarch to guide it. Rational matter on the
other hand needs the aristocratic sensitive matter to act as liaison with the general
populace, or the crude and unrefined inanimate matter.
We have seen in earlier chapters that it is common for Cavendish and her
contemporaries to see nature (as viewed through a particular theory or philosophical
filter) as a metaphor for contemporary society. Perhaps Cavendish employs this
hierarchical model, as seen in her view of history (as seen through Norbrook in William’s
biography) and in her explanation of matter (as interpreted in Observations), as a guiding
structure for Blazing World and the philosophical and social critique she creates therein.
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The evidence in the text seems to hint that this is a valid and probable way of viewing the
text and that through the characters in the Blazing World, we begin to recognize the
Empress (the monarch), the counselors (the aristocracy), and the common inhabitants of
the world as figures of rational, sensitive, and inanimate matter respectively. As these
characters interact in the constructed sociopolitical system of the Blazing World, we see
how Cavendish dramatizes her theory of matter and critiques not only natural philosophy,
but also society, gender, and politics as well.
Examination of Blazing World’s plot reveals many similar examples of social
hierarchy. The story begins with a romance involving issues of class and marriage. After
the young man falls in love with the Empress-to-be, he realizes that he can never have her
because he is “beneath her both in birth and wealth” and therefore determines “to steal
her away” (125). Immediately Cavendish shows how fortune and the gods smile upon
the woman and punish the kidnapper for his violation of social code. His ship is sent up
North, where he and his crew perish of the cold while the future Empress survives “by
the light of her beauty, the heat of her youth, and protection of the gods” (126). The
immediate issues in the text are ones of social hierarchy, and the reader is quickly
acquainted with the problems that ensue when one disrupts the “natural” (to Cavendish
and other aristocratic royalists) order of social class.
Just like the Empress’ old world, her new Blazing World is also one of class
distinctions. The Empress belongs to the highest group of people, which is the imperial
family, the only people allowed to have gold or jewels (133). The imperial “race,” as
Cavendish calls it, is tightly centered on the monarchy and is carefully controlled. The
clergy are also part of this family, but are made eunuchs to keep the royal family small
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enough so that only the Empress, her husband, and posterity intended for the throne can
reproduce (133). The second group consists of the imperial counselors, who are part of
the animal-men that inhabit the world and are gifted in natural philosophy, oration,
mathematics, and other “intellectual” fields of study. Lower down the social ladder exist
the common people, also animal-men: “Of these sorts of men, each followed such a
profession as was most proper for the nature of their species, which the Empress
encouraged them in” (134). Each person in the new world has a duty that is most fitting
to his or her nature, and in this ideal world for Cavendish, each person has a defined
place in society and doesn’t attempt to rise above or descend below it.2
Cavendish believes that these class distinctions bring order and preserve the peace
of the Blazing World: “For there was but one language in all that world, no more but one
Emperor, to whom they all submitted with the greatest duty and obedience, which made
them live in a continued peace and happiness, not acquainted with other foreign wars, or
home-bred insurrections” (130). In addition to class distinctions, Cavendish shows that
ecclesiastical monarchy is best form of government at preserving peace and order.
Cavendish examines this further in the text. As the Empress makes her way to the
golden city in the new Blazing World, the Cavendish records, “No sooner was the Lady
brought before the Emperor, but he conceived her to be some goddess, and offered to
worship her; which she refused, telling him […] yet was she but a mortal […]. But her
subjects, who could hardly be persuaded to believe her mortal, tendered her all the
veneration and worship due to a deity” (132). Through this political model, it is clear that
in Cavendish’s mind, a powerful monarch rules the ideal state, regardless of sex. This is
2

For a post-modern critique on Cavendish’s view of race, social class, and gender, see Sujata Iyengar
“Royalist, Romancist, Racialist: Rank, Gender, and Race in the Science and Fiction of Margaret
Cavendish.” ELH 69 (2002): 662.
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in line with her political views in life as a devoted royalist, as well as her personal
ambition to be “the Most Excellent Princess,” as she sometimes signed her name in
publications. Cavendish gives a reason for a monarchy through “nature” and through
religion and denounces the virtue of a commonwealth,
[The statesmen] answered [the Empress], that as it was natural for a politic
body to have but one governor; and that a commonwealth, which had
many governors was like a monster with many heads: besides, said they, a
monarchy is a divine form of government, and agrees most with our
religion; for as there is but one God, whom we all unanimously worship
and adore with one faith, so we are resolved to have but one Emperor, to
whom we all submit with one obedience. (134)
Cavendish shows that the unity brought about by this “natural” form of government not
only agrees with the natural order but also brings peace upon the whole planet, and unlike
other early modern utopias, such as Bacon’s utopia, the inhabitants of this new planet
have no need for guns or weapons of any kind.3
The rationale given by the counselors to the Empress is similar to arguments on
government made by royalists in the seventeenth century, suggesting that a monarchical
system of government mirrors a perfect heavenly government, and through political
alliance we may thus assume that this view represents Cavendish’s actual political
opinion. This proposal of a monarchical system of government also relates to
Cavendish’s natural philosophy and her shift from atomism to her hierarchical theory of

3

Contrast Blazing World, “And as for guns, there was no use for them, because they had no other enemies
but the winds” (129) with New Atlantis where the residents of Bensalem produce “Ordanance [sic] and
instruments of war, and engines of all kinds: and likewise new mixtures and composition of gun-powder,
wildfires burning in water, and unquenchable” (321).
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matter. Just as the statesmen in Blazing World compare the commonwealth to a “monster
with many heads,” Cavendish compares atomism to a coat with many heads of insects by
explaining, “[…] There cannot be atoms in nature, or else nature would be like a beggar’s
coat full of lice: Neither would she be able to rule those wandering and straggling atoms,
because they are not part of her body, but each is a single body by itself, having no
dependence upon each other” (Observations 129). The political and scientific metaphors
help to solidify Cavendish’s position that both political and natural systems need to have
a ruling head. To Cavendish, both democracy and atomism carry a dangerous
implication, and she feels that policies and theories that treat all elements of their systems
equally can only result in chaos. Instead of showing nature as “democratic” and
disorderly, Cavendish places a monarch (the Empress) at the head of her political model
in Blazing World and presents nature as a fitting ruler over her elements in her theory of
matter, held together through a hierarchy of matter in which the rational sub-degree rules.
Cavendish believes not only that having a hierarchical system results in political
peace and avoids social disorder, but also that matter is ordered hierarchically to make
sure nature functions as it ought to, preventing chaos. A year or two before she published
Observations and Blazing World, Cavendish gave up atomism as a theory for explaining
the composition of nature. She did so after considering that if each atom had equal sense
and knowledge, there would be no way for nature to coordinate countless atoms to work
and function together.4 Believing nature to be a “wise” and “orderly” entity, Cavendish
formulates her new theory of matter from her own ideas and parts of existing

4

This is discussed more fully in the previous chapter. For more on Cavendish’s shift from atomism to her
material theory, see Anna Battigelli, Margaret Cavendish and the Exiles of the Mind (Lexington, KY:
Kentucky UP, 1998) 49 and Lisa Sarasohn, “A Science Turned Upside Down: Feminism and the Natural
Philosophy of Margaret Cavendish.” Huntington Library Quarterly 17 (1984): 297.
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philosophical theories, both ancient and modern (Observations 105).5 Through these
ideas, she constructs her theory to ensure that it reflects and explains the order she sees in
nature. Cavendish doesn’t believe that nature could have order through an atomic
“democracy,” but instead must be constructed of a natural hierarchy, with rational matter
as the ruling monarch, being the most refined and the most knowledgeable of all the
degrees. To Cavendish it is the control center for all other parts of matter.
The political ideology presented in Blazing World by the Empress’ statesmen not
only mirrors Cavendish’s actual political beliefs, but also figuratively represents her
theory of matter. Cavendish arranges the constituents of her narrative to represent the
parts of her material theory. She places the Empress at the head of the hierarchy,
representing the monarchical rational matter. Next she places her animal-men counselors
to represent sensitive matter with their ability to receive knowledge from their senses as
is most appropriate for their species. At last the rest of the Empress’ kingdom, consisting
of the remaining populace and rough elements of the Blazing World, represents
inanimate matter, which is acted upon by the animal-men scientists and contemplated by
the Empress.
It is not too surprising that the Empress and others in the Blazing World personify
Cavendish’s hierarchy of matter. Cavendish has done so similarly on theological terms.
She symbolically shows the order of matter through examining the order of nature:
God the author of nature, and nature the servant of God, do order all things
and actions of nature, the one by his immutable will, and the all powerfulcommand; the other by executing this will and command […] for God’s
5

As discussed in the previous chapter, Cavendish builds her theory on not only those of Plato and Aristotle
(regarding continuous matter, or the relation of matter to motion) as well as other classical thinkers, but
also builds eclectically on the theories of her contemporaries: Descartes, Moore, Hobbes, and others.

54

will is obeyed in nature’s self-motion; which self-motion God can as
easily give an impart to corporeal nature […] but […] Reason must judge,
sense execute […]. (Observations 210)
Cavendish suggests that rational matter acts with sensitive and inanimate matter as God
acts with nature and material, proving to us that there is yet another hierarchy that
resembles the structure of the degrees of matter. Cavendish’s illustration of nature and
God working on the elements in a similar three-part hierarchy only reaffirms Cavendish’s
assertion that her theory of matter, with its flow of power from the top downward, is most
natural. Cavendish’s theological point from Observations is also drawn back into the
metaphor of the Empress’ statesmen, showing that “as there is but one God, whom [they]
all unanimously worship and adore with one faith, so [they] are resolved to have but one
Emperor” (Blazing 134).
There are other examples of Cavendish using religious ideas in conjunction with
natural philosophy, although critics as well as Cavendish herself have claimed the
contrary. As Cavendish uses reason and religion to support her political views, she also
uses religion and scientific views to support each other.
Yet Cavendish was not a theologian, and many scholars see more secularism in
Cavendish than her contemporary natural philosophers. Quoting Cavendish, in her article
“Ideas in the Mind: Gender and Knowledge in the Seventeenth Century,” Paula Findlen
asserts that among her female contemporary philosophers, “only Margaret Cavendish
seems to have actively sought to separate theology and philosophy. ‘Neither can
Theology and Natural Philosophy Agree… for Philosophy is Built all upon Human
Sense, Reason, and Observation, whereas Theology is built upon an Implicit Faith’” (187,
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emphasis added). An example of this separation in Blazing World is when the spirits tell
the Empress, “you mortals are so puzzled about this divine faith, and natural reason, that
you do not know well how to distinguish them, but confound them both, which is the
cause you have so many divine philosophers who make a gallimaufry both of reason and
faith” (167). Here Cavendish suggests that placing reason and religion in the same realm
will destroy faith and at the same time unravel reason. It is probable that through the
advice that reason and religion remain separate, Cavendish is attempting to avoid
contemporary religious controversy, created in part by the Cambridge Platonists and
Latitudinarians, rising from reading religion through the eyes of reason. Indeed the
Empress, an imaginary form of Cavendish herself, will not tolerate folly of reason in her
court. The irony is that the subjects that tell the Empress of the differentiation of faith
and reason are spirits themselves, and are not subject to natural philosophy but religion
and mysticism.
But at times Cavendish cannot entirely escape using reason to justify religion. It
is evident in her explanation of the monarchical system of government as the most
natural; “For as there is but one God […] so we are resolved to have but one Emperor, to
whom we all submit with one obedience” suggesting that it is reasonable to have the
same form of government that God instituted (Blazing 134). Cavendish is no theologian,
and she is not claiming any right to present new religious doctrine. But she is a
philosopher of nature, and for a devoted seventeenth-century Anglican, God must be
viewed as an important (or even the most important) part of nature.6 Though Cavendish

6

The depth of Cavendish’s religious conviction is not argued here, but many events of Cavendish’s life
suggest at least a strong cultural and political devotion to Anglicanism: her marriage in Catholic France by
an Anglican minister, her attendance in the Anglican congregation at Richard Browne’s chapel in Paris, and
her attendance at Anglican services in Antwerp (Whitaker 80, 87, 128).
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refrains from writing a theology, there are some necessary intersections between religion
and natural philosophy. In a fantasy like Blazing World, this juncture sometimes occurs
figuratively.
One example of combining reason and religion in Blazing World demonstrates
how Cavendish uses the two together to achieve a desired rhetorical goal. The Empress
(representing rational matter) uses the fact-gathering and reason of her counselors
(representing sensitive matter) to control her subjects’ religious views and convert them
from a general monotheism to Christianity. She has her bird-men bring her a star-stone,
which always shines with a “splendorous and comfortable light” (164). Likewise, she
asks the worm-men how volcanoes always produce fire, and when they tell her of the
fire-stone and that it burns when wet, the Empress “desired the worm-men to bring her
some of that stone, but be sure to keep it secret” (163, emphasis added). Her counselors
reveal the scientific explanation of these stones to her, though they remain a mystery to
the rest of her subjects. She then uses these stones to light her chapels and to teach her
subjects of Christianity.
In the chapel which was lined with the fire-stone, the Empress preached
sermons of terror to the wicked, and told them of the punishments for their
sins, to wit, that after this life they should be tormented in an everlasting
fire. But in the other chapel lined with the star-stone, she preached
sermons of comfort to those that repented of their sins, and were troubled
at their own wickedness. (164)
Here the Empress uses her own power of reason (and that of a few of her counselors) to
make the natural and explainable appear divine and therefore causes her subjects to
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believe Christian doctrine based on faith in a mystery that has a perfectly logical
explanation. “And thus the Empress, by art, and her own ingenuity, did not only convert
the Blazing World to her own religion, but kept them in constant belief, without
enforcement of blood-shed” (164). Although this semi-colonization of religious
principles and the secrecy involved may disturb some readers today, Cavendish the
narrator explains that this use of natural philosophy and cognitive reasoning on the part of
the Empress achieved the important political goal of peace. In this hierarchical system, it
is reasonable to assume that the head, which is in this case the Empress, would be more
privy to information than the lower elements of the system, and with such information
would watch over the lower elements. Indeed the Empress feels that she is doing
something worthwhile for her subjects by introducing them to Christianity, even if the
setting for her chapel of repentance is only powered by a special effect.
Although the Empress in fact colonizes her people with Christian religion,
Cavendish calls these “gentle persuasions,” which have their roots in a reasonable belief
in mystery and the convincing of the mind, similar to Plato’s “myth of hell”: “And after
this manner she encouraged them [her subjects] also in all other duties and employments,
for fear, though it makes people obey, yet does it not last so long, nor is it so sure a
means to keep them to their duties, as love” (164). This “love” is the (white) lie that the
Empress imposes on her subjects, but her aim is not only to get her subjects to love God,
but also to make them good and impressionable political subjects. She uses her natural
philosophy, and therefore her reason, to achieve both ends.
Cavendish has been critiqued for her commanding and vetoing Empress, but
having a strong central figure of control makes sense when seen in line with her theory of
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matter. The power and control of the Empress seems to look as if Cavendish agrees with
Hobbes’s famous “tyrannical” placement of reason. Eve Keller explains, “The utopian
unity of the Blazing World arises not out of communal desire, but rather out of the
autocratic control of knowledge production” (464). Despite the Empress’ control over
knowledge and her religious colonization, it is not necessarily accurate to label her power
as solely limited to herself any more than rational matter has absolute power in the
hierarchy of matter. Perhaps monarchical is a better adjective here. First of all, the
Empress is informed of the nature of the fire-stone and other elements by her aristocratic
counselors, a symbolic resemblance of sensitive matter informing rational matter of the
workings of inanimate matter. The Empress makes the decision to keep the nature of the
fire-stone a secret, but her own knowledge is only made possible through the worm-men.
Figuratively speaking, Cavendish states the same thing in Observations, “the head,
although it is a whole and perfect figure, yet it is a part of the body, and could not subsist
without it” (126). The control of knowledge production doesn’t lie solely in the Empress,
but follows a necessary, and to Cavendish natural, chain of command that depends upon
the cooperation of the lower elements.
Despite Cavendish’s claims that her Blazing World was merely fantastical (“The
end of Reason, is truth; the end of Fancy, is Fiction”), Keller also sees the scientific
theme carried from Observations into Blazing World and suggests that in Blazing World
Cavendish “boldly interrogates the epistemological assumptions and the social agenda
that underline the mechanical philosophy and the experimental method, and, in the
process, offers a critique of new science that is remarkably sensitive to its social and
gendered construction” (448). Indeed, Cavendish not only uses a hierarchical model to
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critique natural philosophy and politics, but she also uses this model in her theory of
matter to critique the category of gender.
One gender implication results from Cavendish’s natural philosophy’s correlation
with the philosophy of Descartes. A recorded reader of Descartes, Cavendish rejects his
separation of body and soul, but maintains some tenets of his philosophy. She believes in
the ability to create whole worlds in her mind through contemplation to the point where
she recommends to her readers of Blazing World that they create a world within their
own minds (Findlen 191, Blazing 124). This “proliferation of worlds and selves” found
in Blazing World challenges the empiricist and mechanical view of the “discrete self and
stable object,” both elements necessary to the success of experimental philosophy, which
Cavendish regards as only secondary (Keller 463). An advantage that comes out of
Cavendish’s use of reason and fancy in Blazing World is that she is able to demonstrate
the limitless nature of rational matter through creating various planets and characters,
even multiple self-representations. Cavendish creates not only the Blazing World in
which her Empress lives, but allows her character within the text, the Duchess of
Newcastle, to create a Philosophical world as well. In her epilogue she urges her readers
to “create worlds of their own, and govern themselves as they please” (225). Because
Cavendish creates several intellectual worlds and urges the creation of even more, some
critics have thought her utopia is instead a form of wish fulfillment or psychosis. For this
reason, Frank and Fritzie Manuel refused to include Blazing World in their utopian
encyclopedia, thinking that Cavendish’s text was a freakish result of some sort of
schizophrenia (Leslie 128). In actuality, the plurality of worlds and selves more likely
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comes from Cavendish’s implementation of Cartesian philosophy; it allows reason to
take precedence over the flesh and permits the mind to explore limitless boundaries.
Many scholars have shown the importance of Cartesian thought in allowing
women to participate in natural philosophy.7 Ruth Perry writes, “Once mind was
separated from body, and elevated, nothing could be argued from physiology; women’s
reproductive capacity could no longer be held against them if all minds were created
equal and rationality was the cardinal virtue” (473). As Perry also shows, Descartes
promoted a mind that could search out knowledge as it came to “free itself from its
attachment to the senses” and “required prior learning inessential” (478). As Cavendish
searches for a way to make her philosophical writings in Observations come to life, to
show how her theory functions, she retreats into her mind, a realm where her sex is
irrelevant and where the elements of her theory become figures in her fancy.
Sujata Iyengar shows a more specific example of this as she discusses the
importance of the imperial family’s eunuchs in the Blazing World (Blazing 133).
Because the “imperial race” (who, along with the Empress, represent rational matter)
“lacks the physical signs of gender difference,” Iyengar argues, they cannot be “identified
as separate or inferior” on basis of gender (662). It is interesting to see that because the
members of this family, in the role of rational matter, do not identify themselves with
sexual markers they seem to be following Descartes’ often quoted assertion that “the

7

To read more on feminist applications and readings of Descartes, see Ruth Perry “Radical Double and the
Liberation of Women” Eighteenth-Century Studies. 18:4: (1985). 472-493. Also Hilda Smith, Reason’s
Disciples. (Urbana, IL: Illinois UP, 1982).
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mind has no sex.”8 This example presents more supporting evidence for Cavendish’s
belief in this assertion.
Cavendish shows that rational faculties in the mind are innate in all humans
regardless of sex; she defiantly asserts, “I will not say, but many of our sex may have as
much wit, and be capable of learning as well as men” (Observations 11). Yet Cavendish
laments that in her time not all scientific inquiry can be achieved through natural rational
powers, but requires training and learning; “But since [women] want instructions, it is not
possible they should attain to it: for learning is artificial, but wit is natural” (11). This
concern may also help explain why Cavendish favors the power of reason above other
epistemological methods; reason is more inherent and hails from a realm where
physiology may be disregarded altogether. Plus, experimental philosophy takes years,
and possibly decades, of training. But natural reason is given to all despite training or
experience, just as rational matter is inherent in every part of matter. Since English
women were not usually well trained in the experimental arts and had little access to
instruments, Cavendish necessarily prefers easily-accessible reason. She prefers it to the
mechanical philosophy, where brute masculine strength and force is favored above the
more feminine self-motion and self-knowledge.9
Through Blazing World, Cavendish uses the combined powers reason, fancy, and
imagination to continue the philosophical critique begun in Observations, while at the
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In “Cartesian Women,” Erica Hearth asserts that this phrase became “something of a feminist rallying
cry” for seventeenth-century women (Yale French Studies 80, 1991: 146-164). This idea had enormous
implications for women of the period in opening up doors to their role in philosophical discourse, and many
studies have been published on the issue, among them the seventeenth-century Poullain de la Barre, De
l’Éegalité des deux Sexes. Paris: Jean Du Puis, 1673 and Londa Shiebinger, The Mind has no Sex?.
Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1989.
9

For an in-depth discussion on the masculinity of mechanism and Cavendish’s resistance to it, refer to the
previous two chapters and the discussion of John Rogers, Anna Battigelli, and Lisa Sarasohn.
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same time she dramatizes her theory of matter in various characters and classes. Her
partiality for the rational degree of matter and its metaphorical equivalent of monarchal
government is clear. Favoring the rational functions of reason and fancy, Cavendish is
able to emphasize a place that places both genders equally, but a place not void of social
hierarchy or political and religious order. In comparison, experimentalism, as we will
discuss in the next chapter, has its elements that favor women as well; however, these
elements carry a democratic fundamental unsuitable to Cavendish’s socially traditional
outlook, demonstrating the careful balance Cavendish must walk between social inequity
and gender equality.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Sensitive Matter and Experimental Philosophy
“Wherefore, the best optic is the perfect natural eye, and a regular sensitive perception;
and the best judge, is reason; and the best study, is rational contemplation joined with the
observations of regular sense, but not deluding arts.”—Cavendish, Observations

Although rational matter is given preferential treatment in Cavendish’s model,
sensitive matter too is very important to her theory. In fact, the sensitive sub-degree of
matter is essential for matter to function in nature as it should. As the mediator between
rational and inanimate matter, its role is crucial. Because rational matter does not act
directly on the crude inanimate matter but employs sensitive matter to execute its will,
rational matter in a sense lives through sensitive matter. Cavendish feels similarly about
the role of the senses. To Cavendish, they are an important part of scientific inquiry, but
are not to rule over reason. Although she values sensitive matter, she places strong
boundaries on its role, and is even more limiting to the use of instruments and
technology, which are used to aid the senses.1 Cavendish believes that sensitive matter,
and therefore the senses (through symbolic connection), are once-removed from rational
matter and pure reason. Art, or human-crafted instruments, are man-made aids for the
senses, not found in nature, and are therefore twice-removed from reason. And so we see
Cavendish’s chain of epistemological practices in a hierarchical order for deriving truth:
reason is the best mode, followed by our natural senses, and lastly, the senses with the aid
of art.
1

Technology is used here to refer to artificial means that aid in scientific discovery and observation. The
use of the term in this way was probably not used until the nineteenth century and is slightly different from
its seventeenth-century meaning, which refers to a study or treatise on the subject of human arts (OED
“technology” def. 1 & 2).
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For Cavendish, sensible matter possesses masculine strength and force, and yet is
second in the material hierarchy.2 This chapter will look more closely at Observations
and will discuss Cavendish’s own observations, her critique of experimental philosophy,
and her argument that the senses are limited as a method of scientific inquiry and that
instruments are often distorting to the discovery process. To further show the scientific
connection between Observations and Blazing World, we will closely examine
Cavendish’s observations on fire, the eyes of flies, and the generation of vegetables,
discussions that reappear in Blazing World in the presentations and explanations of the
Empress’ subjects. This aids our understanding of how exactly Cavendish uses her
fictional narrative to further the philosophical and social critique against the emerging
acceptance of experimental philosophy that she began in Observations.
Cavendish did not always have her intellectual cannons aimed at experimental
philosophy and its professors, but her distaste for the discipline came after time. Katie
Whitaker recounts how Cavendish was at first taken with the experimental philosophy of
Robert Boyle and remarked, “He is a very civil, eloquent and rational writer […] his style
is a gentleman’s style,” but in 1665, especially after reading Hooke’s Micrographia, or
Some Physiological Descriptions of Minute Bodies, she became disenthused (279).
Cavendish rejected the experimentalists’ claim that
[E]xperiments were the only true foundation for a philosophy of nature,
that the society’s experimental results were certain, incontrovertible truth,

2

Cavendish makes it clear that sensitive matter has self-knowledge as has rational matter. The senses,
Cavendish asserts, are knowledgeable themselves. “Some learned conceive, that all knowledge is in the
mind, and none in the senses: For the senses, say they, present only exterior objects to the mind; which sits
as a judge in the kernel, or fourth ventricle of the brain […] and judges them […] which shows, they are
very dull servants; and I wonder how they can inform the mind of what they do not know themselves”
(Observations 153).
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and that their discoveries would bring practical benefits as great as the
inventions of printing and gunpowder, producing revolutions in the arts of
navigation and agriculture, and restoring mankind to its pristine
knowledge and happiness before the fall. (Whitaker 280)
As we will see in this chapter, Cavendish critiques several of the philosophical tenets of
experimentalism, especially that the experimental method can bring more practical
benefits than rationalism and that the philosophy was closer to arriving at objective
certainty in science.
Critics have formulated several reasons for Cavendish’s arguments against
experimental philosophy. Many, including Anna Battigelli, have argued that the
objections came from Cavendish’s politics or proto-feminism. But Ruth Perry shows that
the motivation may not have been feminist alone. Referring to Francois Poullain de la
Barre, a seventeenth-century feminist, Perry argued
Since men and women had the same physiological equipment for
receiving and registering sensations—the same bundles of nerve fibers—
they therefore had the same potential for finding their way to Truth. Once
put on an experiential basis, philosophy became the common intellectual
ground on which men and women might meet to discuss the nature of
thought and of physical matter. (Perry 476)
Perry makes a good case for showing how democratic experimental philosophy is. If
every person has equal power in the senses as Perry suggests, then each person has an
equal right to understanding based on observations. Along these lines, this may have
been an opening for Cavendish and other women to enter the realm of natural philosophy.
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Yet despite this enticement, Cavendish still rejects the theory, preferring a hierarchical
one where reason and rational powers govern the senses and crude matter.
John Rogers presents an explanation to Cavendish’s rejection of the experimental
method by suggesting that Cavendish objects to the theory because of the patriarchal
implications and the supreme rule of brute force in the mechanical philosophy, which
belief came about through the paradigm shift from rationalism to experimentalism and
faith in inductive logic. He argues, “[Cavendish’s] egalitarian infusion of matter with
motion, or the conjecture of innumerable agents of infallible reason, may have emerged
originally from a radical politics of dissent” (199). As we have previously discussed,
Cavendish, as well as many of her contemporaries, uses scientific theory as a metaphor
for the political world that surrounds her. Why she then would reject the sometimes more
democratic methods of inquiry, which favor the senses (which are generally equal among
the human race) for rationalism and reason is a question worth examining in more depth.
Cavendish’s theory, although rejecting democracy through its hierarchical
structure, does allow Cavendish what she wants in society and in scholarship: a place as
an aristocratic woman in scientific discourse. Although Cavendish envisions living
matter with free will, she hierarchically structures it to mimic her ordered society. With
rational parts of matter governing sensible and inanimate matter, she represents the idea
of political rule by a monarch, with the aid of the aristocracy. Because Cavendish agrees
with Descartes that sex was not linked to the mind, and therefore gender is irrelevant
regarding rational powers, her theory of matter metaphorically gives women just as much
power as men within their given social class (or metaphorical sub-degree), while still
maintaining a place in a traditional hierarchy. Recognizing that Cavendish is able to
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project her socially privileged place onto her theory and still argue for a place alongside
her male contemporaries in philosophical discussion, we are left to consider that
Cavendish’s objection to experimental philosophy may not have been gender based, but
class based.
With regard to the debate between rationalism and empiricism, Battigelli argues
that Cavendish preferred rational deduction for the exact same reason that the Royal
Society preferred induction by experiment and observation. Both believed that their
method was a way of correcting human error and avoiding the madness that lead to social
and political unrest (such as the English civil war) (89). But Battigelli also argues that
Cavendish’s main concern with the experimentalists wasn’t their method, “Cavendish’s
real criticism […] lies in their [the experimentalists’] unwillingness to acknowledge the
inevitable interference of their own subjectivity” (107). Other critics suggest the same,
including Sara Hutton who sees Cavendish’s views on mechanistic thought not as a
critique but as a synthesis of principles of rationalism and mechanism (regarding size,
shape, and motion of matter), which Cavendish incorporated into her material theory.
According to Battigelli, when Cavendish critiques the Royal Society’s use of lenses or
gathering of facts, she is showing that there are often gaps between the empirical
evidence and the observer’s conclusions, where the mind must necessarily interpret
information. Since the mind is not always free from subjective thoughts, or sometimes
works with distorting instruments, the products can become corrupted. Battigelli
contends, “Cavendish warned against making statements about the external world,
fearing that claims of objective certainty might be contested in ways that subjective
claims could not be. Her scientific works were the result not of experiment and
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observation but of her subjective thoughts, which, by definition, could not be challenged”
(Battigelli 89). As an informally educated woman in seventeenth-century England,
Cavendish attempts to avoid the strict criticism of other natural philosophers by
remaining in the subjective realm when critiquing their philosophical methods and while
developing her own theory of matter. She makes it clear that her thoughts make sense in
her mind and through her experience, without suggesting that everyone has equal
experience.
Battigelli also illustrates Cavendish’s outright claim to subjectivity as an attack on
the Royal Society and as a guard from claims of “objective certainty” (105). To
Cavendish, everything is subjective and interpreted by the individual. Battigelli claims
this is why Cavendish admits in her preface to Blazing World that she creates her world
to become ‘Margaret the First’ and outright proclaims that it is a world merely in her
mind. Battigelli explains that Cavendish purposely problematizes the “self” (by
presenting herself as three women: Cavendish the author, the character the Empress, and
the character Duchess of Newcastle) to further explore subjectivity, rather than merely
using the narrative for wish fulfillment or fame. If Cavendish merely wanted to become
an empress rather than a subject, she could have ended her narrative quite early, after the
Empress is given power over the new world. In Battigelli’s mind, there is no question
that the rest of the narrative is left to satirize Hooke and his Royal Society Fellows
through a grand conflict that examines subjectivity and objectivity while discussing
experimental philosophy and rationalism (107). On the other hand the Royal Society,
Battigelli argues, saw their objectivity as a natural extension of mechanism, influenced by
Harvey’s contention that humans, and their bodies, are very similar to machines. They
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likened themselves to machines whose job it was to objectively record with their hands
what the eye observed. With only mere observation, they argued, there was little room
for interpretation (93). To the experimentalists, this machine-like objectivity creates a
resiliency to attacks, and it is this claim to objectivity that Cavendish challenges.
To aid the experimentalists in their search for objective truth about nature,
instruments gained prestige among gentlemen-philosophers in seventeenth-century
England, although they had previously been used almost exclusively in lower artisan
classes.3 The second section of Cavendish’s Observations entitled “On Art, and
Experimental Philosophy” introduces her stance on the use of human craft and
technology in experimental philosophy. In this section, she argues that art (technology)
is finite, that humans cannot control natural causes and effects, that sense “cannot be the
ground of reason no more than art can be the ground of nature,” and that “experimental
and mechanic philosophy cannot be above the speculative part” (48-49). Cavendish
holds firmly to the stance that art is usually unnecessary and often harmful in scientific
inquiry. Even as Cavendish disagrees with the experimental method in part because it
places the senses above reason, she shows that when sense, the informer of reason, is
corrupted, the reason will likely falter as well. She later argues that “art causes gross
mistakes and errors, not only in sensitive, but also in rational perceptions; for sense being
deluded is apt to delude reason also, especially if reason be too indulgent to sense”
(Observations 96). She qualifies her stance by stating, “[…] Art may help to mend some
defects, errors, or irregularities in nature, but not make better that which nature has made

3

Although this technology originated from lower classes of tradesmen and artisans, Katie Whitaker shows
that scientific instruments (such as the telescope) in the seventeenth century were generally very expensive
and used as a symbol of social and financial status among the upper classes, including the Cavendishes
themselves (98-99).
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perfect already” (Observations 64). Cavendish hints that experimental philosophy is no
more apt at discovering the nature of the world than a more rational natural philosophy
and at the same time attacks the experimental method’s utility.
Indeed, Cavendish seems to hold the experimental philosophers to a high standard
in expecting that the fruits of their work yield up something of use to society.
But could experimental philosophers find out more beneficial arts […]
either for the better increase of vegetables and brute animals to nourish our
bodies […] or for the advancing of trade and traffic to provide necessaries
for us to live, or for the decrease of nice distinctions and sophistical
disputes in churches, schools, and courts of judicature, to make men live
in unity, peace and neighborly friendship; it would not only be worth their
labour, but of as much praise as could be given to them. (Observations 52)
Cavendish proposes a wide range of possible uses for scientific discovery here, from
nutrition to moral philosophy. She then furthers her statement with an analogy of the
uselessness of the experimental philosophers’ work: “But as boys that play with water
bubbles or fling dust into each other’s eyes […] for wasting time with foolish sports; so
those that addict themselves to unprofitable arts spend more time than they reap benefit
thereby” (Observations 52). Because Cavendish sees most of the experimentalists’
behavior as unfruitful, and their discoveries often distorted through the use of faulty
instruments, she feels that they would be much better off to use reason as the primary
source of scientific truth.
Cavendish’s theory and thoughts on experimentalism are put into practice in
many places in Observations and Blazing World, where she plays along (to a certain
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extent) with the experimentalist’s methods. It is important to view several observations,
both in her fiction and her scientific treatise, to understand how Cavendish contributes to
the discussion of natural philosophy in the two genres and to see the philosophical
importance of Blazing World as a companion piece to Observations. The first
phenomenon we will examine is that of the fire-stone, a stone that burns while
continuously kept wet and has the capability to burn under water. This fictitious element
is not unique to Cavendish. Bacon mentions such a manifestation in New Atlantis under
the arsenal of the island. Although Solomon’s House rules over a peaceful society, its
science has lead to the creation of “ordanance [sic] and instruments of war, and engines
of all kinds: and likewise new mixtures and composition of gun-powder, wildfires
burning in water, and unquenchable” (Bacon 321, emphasis added). There is also such
an element discussed earlier in John Lyly’s Ephues, where the narrator speaks “of a
firestone in Liguria that was quenched by milk and reignited by water” (Whitaker
footnote 283). Cavendish uses this fictional phenomenon to bridge the gap between her
fiction and her serious philosophical study.
What is important about the fictional observations of the fire-stone as seen in
Blazing World, as well as Cavendish’s realistic observances in Observations, is that in
both cases the discovery and use of fire occurs only through the senses, without the use of
artificial means. After the initial observation has taken place, the rational faculties are
exercised to explain the phenomenon and put it to use, emphasizing the principles of
Cavendish’s theory of matter. The fire-stone is seen as the source of volcanic eruption.
It is discovered after the Empress sends her worm-men to find out the cause of volcanoes,
and upon their return, they “informed her Majesty, that there was a certain sort of stone,
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whose nature was such, that being wetted, it would grow excessively hot, and break forth
into a flaming-fire, until it became dry, and then it ceased from burning” (163). Upon
reviewing their observation, the Empress immediately conjectures a use for the fire-stone.
After consulting her rational faculties, she places it in a church, keeping its nature a secret
from her subjects, and uses its eerie light to remind her people of hell and call them to
repentance (163-64). The Empress later uses the fire-stone to help the Duchess of
Newcastle fight a war for England. Since all the ships in this world are made of wood,
and the fire-stone burns as long as it is wet, the Empress sets her fish-men to set fire to
the enemy’s ships (206). At last the Empress uses the fire-stone to set fire to many cities
to strike fear into the hearts of kings so that she could gain control over their lands on
behalf of the monarch of her native land (214). The inclusion of the fire-stone
phenomenon is important to Blazing World because of the method of inquiry used by the
worm-men. In this case, the worm-men find out the cause of volcanoes by using nothing
but their natural senses. No instruments are used, yet through the natural senses of the
worm-men, directed by the rational Empress, several uses are brought about including a
Christian fear of God and unity in the Empress’ original world. Moreover, the wormmen themselves appear merely to be objective observers and recorders of the facts (much
the way experimentalists viewed themselves). It is not until the worm-men have taken
this knowledge to the Empress, metaphorically taking the knowledge gleaned from the
senses to the source of rational thought, that the knowledge is put to any good use. This
furthers Cavendish’s argument in Observations that natural sense is best and more useful
when tempered by the higher powers of reason, rather than the senses aided with art
alone.
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In Observations, Cavendish includes several discussions about flame and
combustions but excludes any discussion of an element with the properties of a fire-stone.
However, Cavendish does take notice to the various types of flames, such as the
differences between “flame of oil, the flame of wood, the flame of ‘aqua-vitæ’ [“life
water,” or alcoholic liquids], the flame of gums, and the like” (Observations 134). She
also distinguishes between liquid, fluid, and wet qualities in nature: “Flame is fluid, but
not liquid, nor wet: Oil is fluid and liquid, but not wet; but water is both fluid, liquid and
wet. Oil will turn into flame, and increase it, but water is so quite opposite to flame, that
if a sufficient quantity be poured upon it, it will totally extinguish it” (Observations 17).
While directly stating that in reality water extinguishes fire, we believe that Cavendish’s
own propositions of the cause of fire is so based in reality that she will not entertain the
idea of a wet burning fire unless the fire is one that sustains itself on water mixed with oil
or another fuel substance. However, Cavendish’s method of observation avoids any indepth experimentation. Her study of fire revolves around common sense, not the use of
instruments or tools to help her determine its causes, consistencies, or uses. Instead, she
is content to use her senses to glean information and later uses this information to support
her rational thoughts regarding the nature of matter.
Although Cavendish’s Observations do not offer a description of a wet fire,
Cavendish’s comments on ordinary combustion are helpful in determining how the
fanciful fire-stone is theoretically possible in the rational realm and important to
Cavendish’s natural philosophy. In consulting her rational thoughts in describing the
burning of fuel, Cavendish asserts that the “fuel’s consumption or burning, is not made
by the fire, but by the fuel’s own perceptive motions, imitating the motions of the fire; so
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that fire doth not turn the fuel into ashes, but the fuel doth change by its own corporeal
figurative motions, and the fire is only an occasion of it” (96-97). This explanation
makes sense within the context of Cavendish’s theory of matter. Fire is not regarded by
Cavendish to have the power to force itself on fuel and make it burst into flames (as it
may possibly be described by the mechanists). Instead, it is the fuel’s own choice, an
agreement between the several degrees of matter to convert into flames. With the firestone, we see fire “occasioning” water to become like itself, and through water’s own
choice, it bursts into flame.
Cavendish’s discussion of the fire-stone, although fantastical, is an interesting
one, because it follows her theory of matter. Through the governing rational realm,
Cavendish is able to create an imaginary element that allows water to imitate burning
flame. After its creation in the rational realm, she then narrates its discovery through the
natural senses. At that point the Empress is able to find several uses for this discovery,
both in religion and politics. The fiction of the Blazing World gives Cavendish a venue
to contemplate a hypothetical type of fire that could exist because it fits within the frame
of her philosophy. This conjecture also carries with it utility because if such a thing were
actually found in nature, Cavendish has already shown how it could greatly benefit
humankind. Without the reason and sensitive observation combined together, Cavendish
seems to say, the observation of fire may be as useless to natural philosophy as it was to
the worm-men before the Empress’ arrival.
The observational method shifts during Cavendish’ discussion concerning a fly’s
eye, and this study provides an example where art is used in combination with sense and
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reason, and in comparison to the experiments by the worm-men, this observation’s
results, as presented in Blazing World, are less desirable.
The fly’s eye is an important observation because it is easy to identify this
observation as a direct critique of Cavendish’s contemporaries. This discussion is one in
which Cavendish builds directly from Robert Hooke’s Micrographia, referring to it in
both Observations and Blazing World. This observation is important to Cavendish
because through the use of a microscopic lens, common small creatures in nature, such as
insects, could now be perceived as monstrous. Cavendish felt that this was a result of
taking nature out of context and presenting it as something it was not. Through
reviewing Micrographia, Cavendish gained familiarity with Hooke’s recorded
observations, experiments, and sketches of the phenomenon, so she could not avoid the
knowledge that came through the use of the microscopic lens in her discussion. She
critiques the use of lenses in general because “magnifying, multiplying, and the like optic
glasses, may, and do oftentimes present falsely the picture of an exterior object”
(Observations 50). This is part of her thesis from the beginning in Observations, and
Cavendish uses two genres, scientific treatise and fictional narrative, to prove as much.
Cavendish’s main concern is with the lenses’ purpose: the lenses are meant to
show things as they are not, either by bringing the cosmos very close to us on earth or by
making miniscule creatures appear enormously large, thereby distorting nature and
muffling common sense and reason. This seems appropriate for Cavendish, who believes
that sense is inherently less-pure than reason, and that art or technology may corrupt the
senses even further. She shows the destructive result of valuing an instrument that warps
nature at times beyond recognition as she claims
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[Y]et I doubt they will hardly find out the interior nature of our sex, by the
exterior form of their faces or countenances, although very curious, and full of
variety of several beauties; nay, I dare on the contrary say, had a young beautiful
lady such a face as the microscope expresses, she would not only have no lovers,
but be rather a monster of art, than a picture of nature […]. (Observations 201)
Indeed, Cavendish argues, how can art “make better that which nature has made perfect
already?” (Observations 64).
The argument against lenses is introduced in Blazing World when the bear-men,
the natural philosophers in the world, try to prove the worthiness of their various lenses to
the Empress. When they only anger the Empress and each other with the disagreements
about what they observe through the telescopes, they instead turn to their microscopes
and show the Empress “a grey [sic] drone-fly, wherein they observed that the greatest
part of her face, nay of her head, consisted of two large bunched all covered over with a
multitude of small pearls or hemispheres […] the number of them was in all 14,000”
(142). When the Empress asked them what they judged these hemispheres to be, the
answer that “each of them was a perfect eye, by reason they perceived that each was
covered with a transparent cornea, containing a liquor within them, which resembled the
watery or glassy humour of the eye” (143). When the Empress argues that they may
indeed be pearls and that their microscopes might delude their senses, they insist on the
microscopes’ usefulness, saying, “they did never delude, but rectify and inform their
senses” (143). This reasoning parodies that of the experimental philosophers, who did
believe that lenses could be used to correct a faulty perception in the visual sense, but
runs contrary to Cavendish’s logic of a top-down scale. To Cavendish, the senses are
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naturally fitted to their uses, and cannot be made more correct through art since art cannot
“make better that which nature has made perfect already.”
In Observations, Cavendish debates whether or not the 14,000 hemispheres (as
recorded by Hooke) are in fact eyes, but arrives at no certain conclusion. She does
however, divert into a discourse on utility, saying that if they are eyes, then flies must
have a greater use for them and backs it with a metaphor that counters one previously
mentioned by Hooke: “For though art, the emulating ape of nature, makes often vain and
useless things; yet I cannot perceive that nature herself doth so” (59). To Cavendish, if
what the lens presents is actually true, then there must be some inherent need or use for
such a phenomenon to exist.
The question of utility is a valid one. Cavendish doesn’t only question whether or
not the observation is accurate, but she questions why it is important to know that a drone
fly has 14,000 eyes. In order for lenses to be proven beneficial, they must reveal some
useful knowledge to humankind. Eve Keller shows how Cavendish thinks that the use of
expensive telescopes and microscopes were more a show of intellectual and social
distinction rather than a mark of a good natural philosopher (461). This is shown in
Blazing World, when the Empress commands the bear-men to break their glasses (in this
case telescopes) and says that the inhabitants will now “trust only to their natural eyes,
and examine […] objects of their own sense and reason,” but the bear-men proclaim that
the lenses are needful because they allow “one man [to be] though wiser than another”
and if they could not use their lenses “neither would one man be thought wiser than
another, but all would […] be alike” (Blazing 141-42). In this part of the parody,
Cavendish mocks those who use their possession of telescopes and microscopes, instead
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of reason and natural sense, to appear as great natural philosophers. This again shows
that the use of art separates the philosopher from pure, natural ways of observing the
world and results in pettiness and chaos.
Portraying the experimental philosophers as unable to agree on their observations
also functions to question the supposedly objective ground of experimental philosophy.
Eve Keller again gives further insight:
Furthermore, the episode in Cavendish’s fiction functions as an
epistemological critique of the new science’s claim that a boundary could
be marked between matters of fact, about which consensus was to be
expected and therefore could be deemed certain, and explanatory causes,
about which disagreement was permissible and which therefore could
achieve only the status of probability. By having the experimenters
disagree even on what they physically observe (that is, not only on what
might cause the perceived effects), Cavendish challenges the reliability of
such a boundary. (Keller 462)
As Cavendish challenges the experimental philosophers’ claim to objectivity, she attacks
the utility of the philosophy, its very purpose in being. Experimental philosophy was
meant to curb the biases and errors of rationalism, but instead, in Cavendish’s portrayal,
posses all these faults without the reason of rationalism. Through this discussion,
Cavendish is able to reverse the experimentalists’ critique of rationalism by accusing
them of even greater errors of judgment. Here the Empress joins Cavendish as she makes
several arguments against the New Science and the emerging Enlightenment. She
denounces the use of microscopes and telescopes, asserting that they do not give
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objective results, but distort nature and give way to false interpretations. Furthermore,
the Empress finds no use for the information found through the microscope that flies have
thousands of eyes, unlike the information regarding the fire-stone which proves very
useful in her kingdom. She therefore refuses to allow her philosophers to argue in her
court and commands them to “confine [their] disputations to [their] schools,” and later
orders that the schools be disbanded altogether because varying opinions and degrees of
knowledge “must needs breed factions in their schools, which at last break out into open
wars, and draw sometimes an utter ruin upon a state or government” (Blazing 162, 202).
During Cavendish’s time, arguments at the Royal Society, who swore by their
objectivity, sometimes did lead to factions and side-taking. With these problems in mind,
Cavendish examines and fears the implications of widespread scientific inquiry that
ignores the importance of human connection and only deceives the scholars who swear
by its objectivity. Without any personal interpretation, philosophers risk that the
information they gleaned will have no real purpose.
The last observation we will examine does not present any immediate physical
uses to mankind, but is pivotal in revealing the limits of experimentalism and the
unbounded nature of rationalism. Cavendish’s observations of vegetables, and the
parallel examinations in Blazing World conducted by the worm-men, are important in
Blazing World as they reveal most accurately the failings of the experimental method and
the superiority of the rational realm in scientific inquiry. As she is questioning her
various counselors about the Blazing World’s nature, the Empress asks the worm-men if
they can perceive through their senses the “interior corporeal, figurative motions both of
vegetables and minerals” and the worm-men launch into a discussion of interiority and
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exteriority similar to Cavendish’s in Observations. The worm-men state matter-of-factly,
“Interior, figurative motions of natural creatures are not subject of the exterior, animal,
sensitive perceptions, yet by their rational perception they may judge of them, and of
their productions if they be regular” (Blazing 150). The Empress tests the sincerity of
their claim and tries to persuade the worm-men to use microscopes under the earth to
make their observations, but the worm-men reply that microscopes are not designed for
their optic sense and wouldn’t be advantageous (Blazing 151). Through the voice of the
worm-men, Cavendish lays forth two important ideas: first, senses aided through art are
inadequate to reveal the interior workings of things and second, microscopes are limited
in what exteriors they are able to observe. It is no wonder that the Empress finds the
worm-men as wise as any of her council, and is “wonderfully taken with [their]
discourse,” takes “much satisfaction in several of their answers,” and seemes “well
pleased” with what they have to say (Blazing 151, 153). The worm-men naturally inhabit
a part of their world that is almost completely barred from what we consider optical
perception, showing the limits of the experimentalists’ instruments.
Cavendish is also making a statement here with regard to the realms of the senses
and the mind. To Cavendish, the senses have their distinct realm. They are useful within
the bounds of the bodily senses, but as we move further inward toward nature, we leave
the sensitive and enter the realm of the rational. Indeed we see the hierarchy as outward
and common moving toward the most inward and pure as the worm-men tell the
Empress, “Interior, figurative motions of natural creatures are not subject of the exterior,
animal, sensitive perceptions, yet by their rational perception they may judge of them
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[…]” (Blazing 150). Cavendish uses the discussion of seeds to show the importance of
weighing the inward motions of things against the outward appearance:
And since the exterior figures of creatures are not the same with the
interior, but in many or most creatures quite different; it is impossible that
the exterior shape and structure of bodies can afford us sure and excellent
instructions to the knowledge of their natures and interior motions, as
some do conceive. (Observations 70)
What Cavendish infers here is that experimental philosophy ignores internal workings
and motions, and by so doing misses a large portion of nature’s actions by focusing only
on forces and appearances from the outside. “Yet no microscope is able to present to our
view those inward points by the inspection of the exterior figure and shape of those
vegetables,” Cavendish argues (Observations 70). In her mind, experimental philosophy,
especially where lenses are concerned, is not able to even approach the extent of
understanding of nature that rationalism yields. On another figurative level, the mind
itself is viewed as an interior place, while the body is exterior. Through emphasizing the
importance of understanding interiors, and using them in natural philosophy, Cavendish
returns again to the same argument made by Descartes, that the interior part of being,
namely the mind, possesses a superiority, regardless of sex, that the exterior body cannot
attain.
Cavendish furthers her discussion of interior and exterior shape, figure, and
actions in Observations. She explains the distinction by saying that we may see or
“pattern out” objects, be they animals, vegetables, or minerals, and we perceive what they
are made of and the size of their shape, but we cannot tell “the cause of their being such
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figures” (Observations 175). She uses an organic analogy as she compares the workings
of vegetables to the digestion of a man. Others may not be able to perceive that he is
digesting by looking at his exterior, but the perceptive parts of his organs tells him that he
is digesting and therefore reveal to him a certain interior nature of his body (Observations
175). When there is a shift from the study of the external to study the internal nature of
something found in the world, it takes both sense and reason to come to an accurate
observation.
Although Cavendish thinks this is a pursuit suitable for reason to inquire, she does
not think it is appropriate for experimental philosophy and will be useless for the
improvement of humankind. She remarks that the
[… I]nspection of vegetables, doth not give us any knowledge how to sow,
set, plant, and graft; so that a gardener or husbandman will gain no
advantage at all by this art […] For unless they could discover their
interior, corporeal, figurative motions, and the obscure actions of nature,
or the causes which make such or such creatures; I see no advantage they
yield to man. (Observations 9)
To Cavendish, the experimental philosophy does a great disservice to natural inquiry
because it remains only outward observation and fails to be processed by the rational
faculties. In many cases Cavendish says that it cannot even attempt to penetrate the
interiority of nature, as reason can, or it may rapidly distort it. “The truth is, most of
these arts are fallacies, rather than discoveries of truth; for sense deludes more than it
gives a true information, and an exterior inspection through an optic glass, is so
deceiving, that it cannot be relied upon: Wherefore, regular reason is the best guide to all
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arts […]” (Observations 9). When sense can be employed, reason should be the
governor, and when we enter a realm sense cannot reach, reason will be our means of
inquiry.
Cavendish was more skeptical of experimental science than her contemporaries in
the Royal Society, for although men like Boyle admitted to an extent the fallibility of
science as it now stood, they believed that through the experimental process it could be
perfected. Cavendish disagreed, believing “that such perfect knowledge was in principle
impossible, even in the future, simply because of the infinity of nature and the finiteness
of humanity” (Whitaker 307). Because Cavendish believes that science cannot be
separated from the social, political, or more human elements, there should be room for
subjectivity and individual reasoning. Through her dissent, Cavendish argues not that
experimental philosophy has no benefits, but warns that reason must be placed first, to
guide the senses and protect the philosopher from self-deception.
One of the largest weaknesses in the experimental method, according to
Cavendish, is its claim to objectivity and its theoretical shunning of individual and
personal thought, evaluation, and experience. Yet, Cavendish claims, there can be no
such objectivity in any natural philosophy. Through their use of instruments and their
methods of observation, the experimentalists have tricked themselves into thinking that
they are mere onlookers and recorders of nature’s processes, ignoring their subjective and
biased interpretations of not only the information placed before them, but their methods
in receiving such information. Cavendish instead argues how any natural philosophy
could not be subjective, how the prevailing epistemological method could not appeal to
its proponents because it resonates with something subjective in themselves. It is this
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subjectivity, this connection to our own rational patterns, that Cavendish lauds, for it is
only when we are willing to see how our view of nature shapes our view of human and
social nature that we begin to be enlightened.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Gender and Narrative

With so many similarities between Observations and Blazing World, especially
with regard to their detailing Cavendish’s theory of matter, we may wonder why
Cavendish deemed it necessary to add “a work of fancy” to her “serious philosophical
contemplations” (Blazing 123). Beyond dramatizing her theory of matter, what more
does this narrative, this early modern utopia, add to Cavendish’s scientific writings?
What does it allow her to accomplish that an essay or treatise could not? What response
does Blazing World give to other male-constructed early modern utopias? We have so
far examined Cavendish’s two works, Observations on Experimental Philosophy and
Blazing World and the ways that these texts collectively (through their congruencies and
discrepancies) convey Cavendish’s theory of matter and critique of experimental and
mechanical philosophies of scientific inquiry. Here we will examine how the Blazing
World narrative provides Cavendish, as a woman, an important venue to explore natural
philosophy where she can control or change certain aspects of society, such as women’s
roles in society and their association with Eve. This chapter briefly shows how Blazing
World contrasts with Bacon’s scientific narrative, New Atlantis, in offering a female
perspective in scientific narrative and in addressing valid concerns regarding
Enlightenment science and its control over space and reproduction.
Cavendish tells her reader that she writes Blazing World not “out of a
disparagement to philosophy” but as a “voluntary creation or production of the mind […]
agreeable to the subject treated in the former parts [Observations]” (Blazing 124). She
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wants her reader to know that not everything in her narrative is to be taken literally since
it is an act of the imagination, but warns the reader also not to take Blazing World too
trivially because it is as important a companion to Observations as the imaginary realm is
to our real-life experience, and thus the two are “joined […] as two worlds at the ends of
their poles” (Blazing 124). Cavendish makes it clear that the Blazing World is only in
her mind, but that this mind is an immensely important creative space where infinite
worlds are made and explored (Blazing 124). Although Cavendish uses Observations to
explore the ‘real’ world in which we physically experience life, she intends Blazing
World to explore the space of the rational mind, to metaphorically represent her theory of
matter and through narrative dramatize what Cavendish could only imagine.
In searching to understand why a natural philosopher would write a narrative to
accompany his or her “serious philosophical contemplations,” Jean-Francois Lyotard
offers a postmodern perspective on the importance of scientific narrative that applies in
many ways to seventeenth-century scientific writers and in some ways to Cavendish. In
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Lyotard points out that science’s
implications are “no less sociopolitical than epistemological,” and stresses narrative as
the “quintessential form of customary knowledge,” especially in scientific knowledge
(18-19). Although Lyotard feels that contemporary society (postmodern or even postindustrial) has lost its taste for narrative, he reaffirms their importance:
Narratives […] determine criteria of competence and/or illustrate how
they are to be applied. They thus define what has the right to be said and
done in the culture in question, and since they are themselves a part of that
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culture, they are legitimated by the simple fact that they do what they do.
(23)
Through their intricate connection with culture, narratives carry a legitimizing authority
that other systems, including scientific treatises, do not carry. This is why Lyotard
asserts the importance of scientific narrative as an essential legitimizing step in the
rhetorical language game of epistemology:
Scientific knowledge cannot know and make known that it is the true
knowledge without resorting to the other, narrative, kind of knowledge,
which from its point of view is no knowledge at all. Without such
recourse it would be in the position of presupposing its own validity and
would be stooping to what it condemns: begging the question, proceeding
on prejudice. (29)
This theory of legitimation is somewhat complicated for Cavendish’s scientific narrative,
which remains skeptical and “other” from her culture. Writing from a female, royalist,
informally schooled, and somewhat rationalist perspective in a predominantly male,
democratic, university-educated, and empiricist society, Cavendish cannot hope to have
her narrative accepted wholly through a supposed connection to contemporary culture
and democratic consent. Yet it is very apparent that Cavendish’s narrative is another step
in the language game, an attempt at dramatizing the possible ways to find truth and the
limits of the senses or art in doing so.
Lyotard’s argument of the necessity of narrative in legitimating science is
important because it points out a prevailing problem of inquiry; epistemes are often set up
to validate themselves (through language games) within their own systems, which often
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result in circular reasoning and proofs, never getting at the actual evidence for their
legitimacy or illegitimacy (30). To Lyotard, narrative is the answer to this problem.
“Narrative knowledge makes a resurgence in the West as a way of solving the problem of
legitimating the new authorities. It is natural in a narrative problematic for such a
question to solicit the name of a hero as its response: Who has the right to decide for
society? Who is the subject whose prescriptions are norms for those they obligate?” (30).
Narratives legitimize science because they bring the scientific into the social and political
realms. They make science a matter of authority and even morality. Lyotard explains,
This way of inquiring into sociopolitical legitimacy combines with the
new scientific attitude: the name of the hero is the people, the sign of
legitimacy is the people’s consensus, and their mode of creating norms is
deliberation. The notion of progress is a necessary outgrowth of this. It
represents nothing other than the movement by which knowledge is
presumed to accumulate—but this movement is extended to the new
sociopolitical subject. The people debate among themselves about what is
just or unjust in the same way that the scientific community debates about
what is true or false; they accumulate civil laws just as scientists
accumulate scientific laws; they perfect their rules of consensus just as the
scientists produce new ‘paradigms’ to revise their rules in light of what
they have learned. (30)
Here Lyotard draws tight connections between science and the sociopolitical realm in
narrative, showing that narrative legitimizes science because it removes it out of its selfjustifying system as it comments to the social and political communities. Although
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Lyotard is speaking mainly of post-industrial narrative, his explanation of the scientific
narrative fitting into the “new” scientific attitude poses certain problems for examining
Cavendish. Even though the connections between the scientific and sociopolitical realms
fit our reading of Blazing World, Lyotard admires the progress and radical political
democracy adopted by the puritans and “new” scientists that Cavendish avoids (and even
shows as ridiculous in Blazing World when the Empresses’ counselors cannot agree on
observations, and their underlying causes, after long, foolish debates). However,
Lyotard’s description legitimates the narrative of Sir Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis,
which we will examine here, with its detailed school of natural philosophers, who are
upheld and revered by the society, and through consensus govern not only scientific
inquiry but also the social and political realms.
Lyotard’s explanation of the importance of narrative in knowledge production
both advances Cavendish’s position and complicates it through advocating democratic
consent in identifying knowledge. David Norbrook realizes this uneasy position in
Cavendish critique and identifies an important difference in Cavendish’s narrative
writing:
Cavendish is endlessly interested in the ways identity is constructed by
custom and convention, and her materialism celebrates nature and the
body. In the current era of revisionist historiography, she is congenially
skeptical about grand narratives, finding Fortune and contingency rather
than pattern in history. Her scientific interests were marginalized by
traditional narratives of the rise of scientific truth, but now that scientific
texts are often read in terms of their rhetoric rather than their verifiability,
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collapsing knowledge into power, qualities earlier regarded as eccentric
become another cause for celebration. Her works offer a medley of
different voices which seldom offer a conclusion as definitive. (Norbrook
182)
With this in mind, we see that because we now have developed an awareness of language
games played in science,1 we have lost the admiration for grand narratives and appreciate
the eclectic and eccentric nature of Cavendish’s writing.2 Because we see how the
experimentalists and mechanists used language and metaphor to promote their scientific
views and make them the dominant scientific ideology in the seventeenth century, we are
now set up to appreciate Cavendish’s alternative narrative, which is so different from
early modern utopias composed by her male contemporaries.
Lyotard also makes some concessions later in Postmodern Condition and cautions
against democratic consent as an absolute means for determining knowledge; “the
principle of consensus as a criterion of validation seems to be inadequate” (60). Instead,
he insists on the quest for paralogy, for thinking otherwise, for removing oneself from the
general hypothesis or traditional knowledge, not for innovation’s sake, but for
challenging the system in which the hypothesis occurs and thus re-conquering “the right
to science” (61, 31). This is where Cavendish’s Blazing World comes in as a valuable
narrative. In Blazing World, caucus fails as a means to arrive at scientific truth among
the counselors, and instead it is through a progression of presentations, with the Empress
inquiring, prodding, and challenging her counselors, that some satisfaction is reached in
discovering the nature of the world where the knowledge is useful (either in a
1

Lyotard The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1997) 40-41.

2

Lyotard 37.
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metaphorical/sociopolitical, military, or everyday sense) or exposes the limits of
experimental observation. To Cavendish, the results of her science as shown through her
narrative are a quest for paralogy, for thinking otherwise that becomes unique and
legendary in her own terms. As a former political exile and female outsider in natural
philosophy, she is countering the new norms of mechanical and experimental philosophy.
Contrasting Blazing World with Sir Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis, we see how
truly “other” Cavendish’s narrative is. New Atlantis is a good example of a grand
scientific narrative as described by Lyotard because it illustrates the “new” scientific
principles of arriving at truth through consensus and blurs civil laws with scientific
principles. As suggested by Marina Leslie, New Atlantis was very likely a source for
Blazing World. As in Blazing World, Bacon’s utopia explores the scientific, political,
and religious implications in an imaginary society. Although all of these elements of
society are discussed, it is largely felt among critics that one of the utopia’s most
important aspects is that it explores the hypothetical benefits of experimental science, and
most of the societal issues are a result of the strong scientific program discussed in New
Atlantis. Published “not perfected” in 1627, the narrative recounts the adventures of
Spanish sailors who arrive on an uncharted island in the Americas, a country whose
advances and Christian religion are far above any other country in the world. The sailors
soon come to see that this is an ideal society; even its capital city, Bensalem, means
literally “son of peace.” Here in this city the Spanish are integrated into a pre-existing
society, and are in a sense colonized by the inhabitants of Bensalem, showing an ironic
twist on the other that differs from usual early-modern utopia.
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In New Atlantis, Bacon has created the perfect society, run by an oligarchy of
learned men, i.e. natural philosophers, called the House of Solomon (the Royal Society
would take inspiration from this fictional group). Peace reigns and patriarchy is firmly in
place. Their religion is perfect Christianity, made possible by the Miracle of Renfusa,
where the Holy Scriptures were sent intact to the island. In addition to having a perfect
knowledge of Christian theology, there are a number of converted Jews that inhabit the
land, hinting that the society is close to a millennial state (Bacon 313). In her book,
Renaissance Utopias and the Problem of History, Marina Leslie suggests that Bacon
includes religion in New Atlantis because he wants to show his utopia as a fable of history
that is more than simply fiction (84). But there is something more at stake. Through his
narrative, Bacon may be striving, as Lyotard suggests, to bring his science (including
experimentalism) into the moral and sociopolitical realm, thereby justifying his scientific
program and method of inquiry. And for Bacon and other contemporaries, science was
necessarily part of something grander in society and the movement of history. In
speaking of early-modern experimental philosophers such as Bacon, Eve Keller observes,
“They were prophets of a new age, and the golden world they were striving to build
would be dedicated, as Bacon said, to ‘the glory of the Creator and the relief of Man’s
estate’” (447). Bacon shows that Bensalem is better for the developments of Solomon’s
House, as they have relieved the state of the citizens as well as the Spaniards: “It seemed
to us that we had before us a picture of our salvation in heaven; for we that were awhile
since in the jaws of death, were now brought into a place where we found nothing but
consolations” (301, emphasis added). The sailors also say that they think the island is
more “Angelical, rather than magical” (306). It is interesting to note that this heavenly
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peace the sailors feel is brought about by the progress of the new nation they are in and
its man-made improvements through scientific mastery.
The politics of Bensalem are somewhat hard to follow. In the narrative, the island
is described as both a “state” and “kingdom,” but as Denise Albanese observes,
“Monarchy is in fact displaced to an antiquarian concern” (516). Solomona is the only
king mentioned, and he seems to be merely a part of history, being replaced by the
brotherhood of scholars who bear his name. The natural philosophy and epistemological
inquiry of Bensalem has been taken out of the realm of a monarch and placed in the
hands of the goodly few who poses the philosophical and political power. This society
has far less class distinctions than Bacon’s England, but resembles the ideal state some
parliamentarian figures and natural philosophers sought and attempted to implement in
the mid-seventeenth century, a political system that Cavendish vigorously opposes.
Bacon’s utopia is largely scientific, showing his belief in the role of scientific
progress in the ideal state. Bacon’s vision has been praised not only among seventeenthcentury natural philosophers (such as the Royal Society), but has been applauded by
some twentieth-century writers. H.G. Wells hails the science of The New Atlantis:
It embodies a new conception in human life, the conception of continual
organized research. All the other Utopias present islands, communities and
worlds of happy and exemplary completion and self-satisfaction, but the
Utopia of Francis Bacon is a world of seekers after knowledge, a world
growing perpetually in knowledge and wisdom and incidentally growing in
power. It is a world ruled by organized science. (Qtd. in Nate 173)
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The type of science Wells admires is of Enlightenment kind, and it is critiqued by some
postmodern readers. Although this fictional narrative contains some mythical aspects,
such as the ‘water of paradise’ (a fountain of youth) for “the health and prolongation of
life,” much of the scientific advances were later achieved in reality during the
seventeenth century or during the Enlightenment (306). The House of Solomon
subordinates nature to man, and makes animals, “Greater or taller than their kind is; and
contrariwise dwarf them, and stay their growth; we make them more fruitful and bearing
than their kind is; and contrariwise barren and not generative” (318). James Hulston
argues, “In contrast with Bacon’s usual insistence on the subordination of knowledge to
use, the researchers seem to see an inherent value in the technological domination of
nature” (54). Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer critique Bacon in particular for
spurring the dominating ideology that was perpetuated by the Enlightenment. What they
say of Bacon could be applied to his ideas as revealed in the House of Solomon, “What
men want to learn from nature is how to use it in order wholly to dominate it and men.
That is the only aim” (Adorno 49). Although the statement that domination is “the only
aim” of Baconian experimental philosophy may be over-simplified (Bacon himself said
that it was for ‘the glory of the Creator and the relief of Man’s estate’), it does seems
strange that an island so remote and peace loving, which makes a practice of
transforming all foreigners into natives, would need to develop “ordanance [sic] and
instruments of war, and engines of all kinds: and likewise new mixtures and composition
of gun-powder, wildfires burning in water, and unquenchable” (321). In the postmodern
era, the implications of this kind of domineering science may strike us as eerie. However
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disquieting it is to us, it was seen by many in the seventeenth century as a positive goal of
science.3
In comparison with New Atlantis, Blazing World is also a utopia that describes “a
world of seekers after knowledge.” The imperial counselors in this world resemble to a
degree the House of Solomon, but with the important addition of accountability to a
higher political figure—the Empress. Through this construction in her narrative,
Cavendish is able to present an alternative to democratic consent of scientific knowledge
without placing all knowledge control in the Empress’ hands, maintaining a hierarchical
chain-of-command where epistemological assumptions are checked by a benevolent
authority figure.4 Unlike Bacon, Cavendish refuses to take scientific inquiry to its
uttermost limits in Blazing World, cutting off the imperial societies to maintain a more
traditional social order. Unlike New Atlantis, Blazing World is not meant to be definitive,
as Norbrook observes, but to explore the open realm of the rational mind and the limits of
the physical, sensitive body (182).
Cavendish’s narrative differs not only from New Atlantis but also from other early
modern utopias in that Cavendish doesn’t set her utopia on the earth. Instead, she creates
this world, which meets up with ours at the North Pole, in her mind. “This world… is
composed of the most pure, that is, the rational parts of matter, which are the parts of my
mind” (Blazing 224). This world, she says, is one of many imaginary and rational
worlds, but is just as satisfactory as any space in our physical world; “And although I
have neither power, time nor occasion to conquer the world as Alexander and Caesar did
3

The domineering nature of experimentalism is also seen by the frontispiece of Sprat’s History of the Royal
Society, showing Brouncker, Bacon, and a bust of Charles II, with a background of military arms—a
promised benefit of seventeenth-century experimental science.
4

Refer to our discussion regarding Hobbes’ “tyrannical” placement of reason in chapter three.
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[…] I have made a world of my own” (Blazing 124). Cavendish’s husband William,
Duke of Newcastle, in a dedicatory poem preceding the narrative, emphasizes this
difference as he points out that the world of Columbus was not created but merely
discovered:
Now this new World was found, it was not made,
Only discovered, lying in Time’s shade
Than what are You, having no chaos found
To make a World, or any such least ground?
But your creating Fancy, thought it fit
To make your world of Nothing, but pure Wit. (Blazing 121)
The attention on the difference between mere discovery and creation show Cavendish’s
own deviations from early modern utopia, where the fictional characters are again mere
discoverers of new lands set upon the earth, unlike the Empress and Duchess characters
in Blazing World, who understand that an infinity of worlds may be created in their minds
if they so choose (188).
The decision to create a world rather than discover one in her fiction is socially
charged. In her article “Royalist, Romancist, Racialist: Rank, Gender, and Race in the
Science and Fiction of Margaret Cavendish,” Sujata Iyengar argues that Cavendish
believes her feminine worlds and conquests are superior to the masculine colonialist
conquests of the New World (654). We see some evidence that Cavendish sees her
creation of the Blazing World as not only more beneficial but also more harmless when
she suggests that she didn’t kill as many people as the real and fictional male conquerors
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of the world did because she “esteem[s] peace before war” (Blazing 224).5 Another
evidence of Cavendish’s anti-colonialist thought comes when in Blazing World the
Empress (upon the advice of the character Duchess of Newcastle) withdraws her semicolonialist scientific programs that incorporate methods of her world, realizing that the
Blazing World would be better off when returned to its original state of order, or turned
from a “worse” world to a “better” one (Blazing 202). Even though this action hurts the
Empress’ pride, she decides that she values a peaceful reign above an “unquiet and
disorderly government,” a government that leads to factions and civil wars similar to
calamities that Cavendish feared and suffered from in her own life (202). Through these
examples, Cavendish confronts ideologies of her male contemporaries in suggesting that
conflict and war, through conquest or through irresolvable debate, are both dangerous and
destabilizing.
Blazing World spans the space of many fictional worlds including the Empress’
world (which throughout the narrative is usually identified as our ‘real’ world as well as
that of the character Duchess of Newcastle), the Blazing World, and the world created by
the character Duchess of Newcastle in her mind, “composed only of the rational, which is
the subtlest and purest degree of matter” resembling in a large part the Blazing World
comprising the narrative (a sort of frame story that includes its own origin within itself—
compare the similarities between Cavendish’s assertion of Blazing World, “This world
[…] is composed of the most pure, that is, the rational parts of matter, which are the parts
of my mind” and the character Duchess’s world “composed only of the rational, which is
the subtlest and purest degree of matter”) (Blazing 188, 124). Because Cavendish’s

5

In the Blazing World, there is no artillery: “and as for guns, there was no use of them, because they had no
other enemies but the winds […]” (129).
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narrative, unlike those of her contemporaries, contains several intellectual worlds instead
of only a fictional portrayal of our world, it is truly “other” from the rest.
For this reason Cavendish received criticism from not only her contemporaries
but some modern critics, who thought her narrative was no utopia but instead a form of
wish fulfillment and psychosis.6 In actuality, the plurality of worlds and selves more
likely comes from Cavendish’s implementation of Cartesian dualism. A recorded reader
of Descartes, Cavendish rejects his separation of body and soul, but maintains many
tenets of his philosophy to the point where she recommends to her readers of Blazing
World that they create a world within their own minds (Findlen 191, Blazing 124). This
“proliferation of worlds and selves,” as Cavendish attempts it, challenges the empiricist
and mechanical view of the “discrete self and stable object” as she explicitly explores the
fictional rational realm rather than the fictional physical (Keller 463). It also explains the
amount of freedom Cavendish had as an early-modern woman to create her own utopia in
the space provided not by the limited earth or moon, but in the space of her mind. Erin
Lang Bonin contests,
The Blazing World […] demonstrate[s] that utopia, as early modern men’s
texts construct it, is a highly conflicted space fore her and for early
modern women generally. In contrast […] Cavendish does not situate her
utopian designs in the new world. For the most part, early modern island
utopias depend upon carefully controlled reproductive economies.
Because such utopian narratives valorize natural law and depend upon

6

For this reason, Frank and Fritzie Manuel refused to put Blazing World in their utopian encyclopedia
(Leslie 128).
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patriarchal paradigms for marriage, family, and the state, they seldom
question women’s nature and place. (339)
Cavendish’s utopia is quite different from those of her male predecessors. These
differences show her unique perspective as an aristocratic woman and the advances made
during the century since Bacon’s time. The Empress seems to have certain feminist
liberties as she possesses power to convert the entire world to Christianity, the right to
deliver sermons, and the ability to change policy to allow women to attend church
meetings.
New Atlantis is much more exclusive in categories of gender. Bacon’s description
of the House of Solomon presents a patriarchal oligarchy where the male scientists are
treated with the greatest reverence and set upon “throne[s] richly adorned” (316).
Although this patriarchy excludes women, Bacon also hints that it seeks to control
various forms of sexual reproduction. The fellows of Solomon’s House maintain
“enclosures of all sorts of beasts and birds,” and through “dissections and trails […] make
them more fruitful and bearing than their kind is; and contrariwise barren and not
generative” (318). Likewise, one of the society’s most celebrated rites is the “feast of the
family,” which is centered on patriarchal customs rewarding males for the production of
offspring. In this ceremony, a man who has lived “to see thirty persons descended of his
body alive together” is honored like a king, at great cost to the state, while his wife, if she
is still alive, is placed in a “traverse placed on a loft above the right hand of the
[patriarch’s] chair, with a private door, and a carved window of glass […] where she
sitteth, but is not seen (310-311). The society of New Atlantis revels in man’s ability to
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propagate life, whether through plants, animals, or human beings, all the time
downplaying nature’s and women’s roles in the process.
Others besides Bonin have noticed how Cavendish responds to the “controlled
reproductive economies” of early modern utopias by providing an alternative to tradition
reproduction, therefore subverting traditional patriarchal claims to offspring. Sujata
Iyengar shows that the Blazing World’s equivalent of the fountain of youth, in this case a
“philosopher’s stone” containing a healing gum that renews the imperial race, presents
the answer in place of reproductive control for at least imperial women (Blazing 155-56).
“This constant renewal explains why the ‘imperial race’ does not die out, even though the
princes are ‘made Eunuchs’” (Blazing 133, Iyengar 664). She explains that the guminduced rebirth is a type of “spontaneous generation” instead of sexual reproduction and
agrees with Carol Neely that such a system that “‘can project the disabling of
patriarchy,’” even while “it evades the question of where, when, and how all species, and
their differences, originate—a question that was intriguing philosophers, and Cavendish
herself” (Iyengar 664). There is evidence that normal sexual relationships may exist
among the lower classes (or those who do not hold positions in church or state) as we
learn that the inhabitants of the world feel “it is not fit […] that men and women should
be promiscuously together in time of religious worship; for [women’s] company […]
makes many, instead of praying to God, direct their devotion to their mistresses” (Blazing
135). Yet even if there are some remnants of sexual reproduction, it is only practiced the
lower classes, and those in positions of power are unencumbered by sexual circumstances
(Iyengar has also shown that the imperial race “lacks the physical signs of gender
difference”), showing the beginnings of the breakdown of patriarchy in the state’s
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function of Cavendish’s utopia where the leaders are distinguished according to gender
(662). The observations of the worm-men, the most admired counselors in Blazing
World, reaffirm spontaneous generation as the means of production in nature, for
“maggots [are] bred out of cheese” and worms are sometimes “produced out of flowers,
some out of roots, some out of fruits, some out of ordinary earth” and that plants are bred
from seeds and “joining and commixing with other parts” (or grafting) instead of natural
pollination or even cloning (Blazing 147, 153, 152, Iyengar 663). Blazing World differs
so dramatically from other early modern utopias through the sheer multitude of asexual
instances and observations, suggesting that Cavendish sought to destabilize the
patriarchal culture of sexual relations through hypothesizing other approaches to the
propagation of life, consistent with her theory of matter. This destabilization of gender
and traditional reproductive roles joins Cavendish’s critique of other patriarchal or
masculinist elements (brute force and conquest, false objectivity, and emphasis on
physical experience) to create a scientific utopia that provides plausible alternatives
outside of the predominant paradigms.
Iyengar’s observation of the imperial eunuchs is also an important one in
resolving some feminist critique against Cavendish. Some critics find it curious that
Cavendish doesn’t have the Empress surround herself with women or offer them more
than a private place to worship. In speaking of Blazing World, Eve Keller offers one such
critique:
Cavendish’s work relentlessly deconstructs the supposedly stable
epistemological categories that service the masculinist science she derides,
but it does not oppose at all the class and gender divisions that regulate the
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social structures of her society. When forced because of her sex to be an
outsider to the strongholds of the scientific community, Cavendish was
able to discern, presciently perhaps, the constitutive role of gender in
knowledge production. But when she is allowed by her fantasy to be an
insider, the gender critique vanishes before a non-critical engagement with
the privileges and pleasures of her class. (466)
Keller makes an important argument about Cavendish maintaining the hierarchy of social
class in the Blazing World (as we have examined in previous chapters as being
represented in her theory of matter), although the case against Cavendish’s lack of
“gender critique” begins to dissolve when we examine how Cavendish has altered the
reproductive economy in the Blazing World. Perhaps the problem is that Cavendish
resolves the concern of gender and power in a way that we wouldn’t expect her to, which
is through physically altering the imperial race to a sexually neutral state. Only the
Empress and the Emperor seem to maintain their sexual identity, (even though this is
somewhat later obscured as the Empress’ spirit is able to enter the male body of the
character Duke of Newcastle), asserting again that scientific inquiry and politics in this
world, this Paradise, is best kept under a woman’s control (Blazing 194).
A second important difference in Cavendish’s narrative is that by placing it on
another planet instead of the new world, she is able to have the Empress recover the
preciously unreachable Paradise of Eden. The Empress is told by her counselors that
Eden is “this world” of which she is “now Empress of,” and that Adam fled into “the
world [she] came from” (Blazing 170). Upon this revelation, Cavendish’s new world
takes readers back to a picture of the restored Paradise (the capital city) and Garden of
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Eden, where a woman is again put in charge of the fate of the world, and this time is
successful at last (here the blame for the fall is placed entirely on Adam, but the Empress,
as a type of Eve, is left to rule unrestrained). This idea that the Empress has stumbled
upon the only true paradise is important for several reasons. John Rogers observes,
“Neglecting in this account any mention of Adam’s helpmeet, Cavendish invites our
identification of the Empress with Eve, an Eve who in the powerfully utopian space of
Cavendish’s fictional and scientific writings has been left to govern Paradise alone”
(178). Seeing the Empress (who, unlike most of the imperial race, conspicuously
maintains her gender identity) as an Eve character is another way to respond to the
critique that Cavendish abandons other females once she has placed her Empress at the
head of the Blazing World, for if she intends to use the Empress as a type of Eve, then
she also can use the Empress as an archetype for women in general, as Eve is commonly
used. As Cavendish makes her Empress/Eve character the heroine and redeeming factor
of the narrative, she is able to redeem women from the accusation that they are linked
with the fall and current corrupt state of the world. If seventeenth-century men (such as
John Swetnam in The Arraignment of Women) could curse women for being heirs to
Eve’s sin and legacy simply by their given sex, then having the Empress discover the
passageway back into paradise would again redeem women by association of their sex.
But this idea is even more important for our purposes as the idea of an Edenic
Paradise relates to scientific knowledge in the seventeenth century. Although Cavendish
may be unique in setting her Edenic return on another planet, other early modern utopias,
such as New Atlantis, hint at a return to a paradisiacal state (the Spanish sailors call
Bensalem “angelic” ) (Bacon 306). Eve Keller suggests that Cavendish’s utopia is
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similar to others because it “responds to the routine promises of Edenic return made
possible by science” (463).7 But Keller shows how the response of Blazing World to the
benefits of science is quite different from contemporary utopias. “But far from endorsing
the simple belief in science as a means to paradise, Cavendish exposes the working of the
connection: freely practiced, scientific association in the Blazing World produces
disunion and dangerous discensus more than any useful knowledge” (463-64). This is
why the Empress and Duchess of Newcastle decide that it would be best to “dissolve” all
the learned “societies” (Blazing 202). Through Cavendish’s narrative, then, the Empress
is able to recover Paradise, endanger its existence through an elaborate and excessive (to
Cavendish) quest for knowledge, and at last restore it to its original state, maintaining
what Cavendish sees as a healthy balance of authority and natural philosophy, avoiding
harsh debate and factions; This in many ways imitates the cycle of Eve in paradise,
falling to Satan’s power in her pursuit of knowledge, but again restoring hope, although
not through posterity (Christ) this time but through the birth of her own ingenuity. In this
way Cavendish is able to take the masculine space of early modern utopia and change it
into a new type of narrative, a narrative of the mind, where gender roles are secondary
and Eve (and therefore all women’s characters) is redeemed. In addition, that the
redemption is brought about through the powers of the mind rather than the abilities of
7

See also the discussion in chapter two regarding Cavendish’s critique of the fall: “But I perceive man has
a great spleen against self-moving corporeal nature, although himself is a part of her, and the reason is his
ambition; for he would fain be supreme, and above all other creatures, as more towards a divine nature: he
would be a God, if arguments could make him such, at least God-like, as is evident by his fall, which came
merely from an ambitious mind of being like God” (Observations 209). See also Whitaker’s account of
Robert Hooke’s claim: “that experiments were the only true foundation for a philosophy of nature, that the
society’s experimental results were certain, incontrovertible truth, and that their discoveries would bring
practical benefits as great as the inventions of printing and gunpowder, producing revolutions in the arts of
navigation and agriculture, and restoring mankind to its pristine knowledge and happiness before the fall”
(Whitaker 280).
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the physical body, once again reaffirming the highest importance Cavendish reserves for
the infinite intellectual realm and rational matter.
Through understanding how Cavendish’s narrative contrasts with New Atlantis
and departs in several ways from other male-authored early modern utopias, we begin to
see how surprising, how “other” Blazing World is. In some ways it functions as a
scientific narrative that seeks to legitimize Cavendish’s theory of matter by taking it into
the social and political realms by combining her science with a review of women’s place
in scientific utopia, and presenting a hypothetical balance between scientific inquiry and
political order. In other ways the narrative works quite differently from what we would
expect. Instead of elevating other women in the narrative, she reduces gender
distinctions within positions of power, hinting, as Descartes claimed, that the mind, and
therefore the rational realm, has no sex.
The narrative of Blazing World functions as a space for the science presented in
Observations to more fully enter the sociopolitical realm. Through the narrative, the
sociopolitical hierarchies serve figuratively for the degrees of Cavendish’s theory of
matter, and the classes represent the knowledge and limits of rational, sensitive, and
inanimate matter. Through this narrative Cavendish is able to deliberately use figurative
ideas and metaphor and present it to the literal scientific community by passing it off as a
piece of fiction, or “fancy.” Although Cavendish, as a wealthy aristocrat, had access to
many of the scientific tools, she still remained at a disadvantage to her male
contemporaries in engaging in experimental philosophy. She lacked the education and a
group of individuals to converse with frequently concerning her findings. In this way it is
her mind that gives her the most opportunity to engage in inquiry.
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There are many ways in which Cavendish’s natural philosophy, as revealed
through Observations upon Experimental Philosophy and Blazing World, demonstrates
what Lyotard refers to as paralogy or “otherness.” Unlike many of her contemporaries,
she insists that subjectivity is not only unavoidable but necessary in philosophical
inquiry, and that any claim to pure objectivity is false and misleading. It is only in the
subjective realm, the rational realm, where philosophical exploration may be infinite,
unfettered by the limits of the senses and the instruments that aid them. Sense is often
valuable, but only when it is tempered by governing reason.
The fusion of matter and motion, promoted by Cavendish and other vitalists in the
seventeenth century and verified in current theoretical models today, counters the
mechanist model where motion and force act upon lifeless matter. Along with the
scientific implications, this model carries with it an important feminist critique. While
the mechanists favored brute “masculine” force in nature through their scientific
metaphors, Cavendish asserts a more gender neutral model, claiming that all matter is
living and equally endowed with reason and sense, choosing for itself if and when it will
change speed or direction.
While Cavendish presents her natural philosophy, a synthesis of ancient and
contemporary methods, as a scientific alternative to pure experimentalism and
mechanism, she cannot help but enter the sociopolitical realm. Indeed, this is
unavoidable if she is going to legitimize her science outside of its own paradigms. She
creates a purely subjective narrative, staring herself as both Empress and Duchess to
validate her subjective stance. By structuring her theory of matter into three parts, she is
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able to mimic her three-tiered society and support the traditional social strata while at the
same time argue for gender equality.
Through her use of scientific narrative in Blazing World, Cavendish dramatizes
her theory while weakening the “discrete and stable object,” making the mind an infinite
realm, purely subjective, full of plural selves and thoughts and void of sexual identity.
Unlike mechanism’s exclusionary emphasis placed on masculine force and
experimentalisms political biases and false sense of objectivity, Cavendish’s natural
philosophy seeks to include not just women, but members of both sexes. The only
qualification to which they must succumb is to recognize the limits of their own bodies
and the infinity of their own minds, to see their thoughts and observations as filtered
through an individual lens, and to recognize the strength of the rational processes, even
imagination, for, as Cavendish asserts, it is not only a prerogative available to her alone,
but it is “in every one’s power to do the like” (Blazing 24).
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